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Healthcare Licensing and Liability  
BENJAMIN J. MCMICHAEL* 
The United States’ affordable care crisis and chronic physician shortage have 
required advanced practice registered nurses (APRNs) and physician assistants 
(PAs) to assume increasingly important roles in the healthcare system. The increased 
use of these nonphysician providers has improved access to healthcare and lowered 
the price of care. However, restrictive occupational licensing laws—specifically, 
scope-of-practice laws—have limited their ability to care for patients. While these 
laws, by themselves, have important implications for the healthcare system, they also 
interact with other legal regimes to impact the provision of care. Restrictive scope-
of-practice laws can increase the malpractice liability risk of physicians and 
decrease this risk for APRNs and PAs via several traditional tort doctrines, such as 
respondeat superior. In this Article, I provide the first empirical analysis of the 
interplay between malpractice liability and scope-of-practice laws in the provision 
of healthcare.  
I concentrate on obstetric care and analyze a dataset of nearly 70 million births 
over an eighteen-year period. The results demonstrate that relaxing APRN and PA 
scope-of-practice laws significantly reduces the caesarean section rate—which is 
currently over three times the rate recommended by the World Health 
Organization—when malpractice liability risk is low. When malpractice liability risk 
is high, however, relaxing these laws results in no change in the caesarean section 
rate. I find similar results for other outcomes, such as medical inductions of labor. 
The results thus elucidate an important interaction between scope-of-practice laws 
and malpractice liability.  
Based on this evidence, which shows that relaxing scope-of-practice laws can 
significantly reduce the number of women who unnecessarily undergo major 
surgery, I argue that states should eliminate restrictive scope-of-practice laws for 
APRNs and PAs. Doing so will remove unnecessary limits on capable healthcare 
professionals, better allow malpractice liability to deter the delivery of unsafe care, 
and improve patient health outcomes. 
  
 
 
 *  Assistant Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law. For helpful 
comments on earlier drafts of this Article, I thank the participants of the Midwestern Law and 
Economics 2018 Annual Conference and the Southern Economic Association 2018 Annual 
Meeting. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As access to healthcare continues to dominate national and local healthcare policy 
debates, much of the discussion has centered on the ways in which individuals pay 
for health insurance. Medicaid expansion, the Affordable Care Act’s health 
insurance exchanges, and value-based healthcare have received a disproportionate 
amount of attention recently. While these debates are important, access to healthcare 
fundamentally depends on a healthcare workforce that is willing and able to supply 
the healthcare demanded by individuals across the country. Indeed, without an 
adequate healthcare workforce, the quality of an individual’s insurance coverage 
becomes relatively meaningless. And recent evidence suggests that many parts of the 
United States lack adequate access to healthcare providers. For example, research 
suggests that demand for physicians could outstrip supply, resulting in a shortage of 
as many as 90,000 physicians by 2025.1 Rural areas could be particularly affected, 
with recent estimates suggesting that the number of physicians practicing in these 
areas could decrease 23% by 2030.2  
In the face of the ongoing shortfall of physicians, advanced practice registered 
nurses (APRNs) and physician assistants (PAs) are increasingly serving as frontline 
 
 
 1. IHS MARKIT LTD., THE COMPLEXITIES OF PHYSICIAN SUPPLY AND DEMAND: 
PROJECTIONS FROM 2017 TO 2032, at 12 (2019), https://www.aamc.org/system/files/c/2/31-
2019_update_-_the_complexities_of_physician_supply_and_demand_-_projections_from_2 
017-2032.pdf [https://perma.cc/PN5G-QZPZ]. 
 2. Lucy Skinner, Douglas O. Staiger, David I. Auerbach & Peter Buerhaus, Implications 
of an Aging Rural Physician Workforce, 381 NEW ENG. J. MED. 299, 300 (2019). 
2020] HEALTHCARE LICENSING AND LIABILITY  823 
 
 
healthcare providers and playing more important roles in the healthcare system.3 
Indeed, APRNs and PAs are the principal source of primary care in many geographic 
areas, and these providers are more likely than physicians to practice in rural and 
underserved areas.4 However, while APRNs and PAs continue to assume more 
responsibility throughout the country, their legal authority to care for patients varies 
widely from state to state.5 Specifically, state scope-of-practice (SOP) laws, which 
are a subset of the more general occupational licensing laws, determine what services 
members of a given profession may provide and the conditions under which they 
may provide those services.6  
States generally justify SOP laws as necessary to ensure patient safety by 
preventing unqualified individuals from providing care.7 While these laws can serve 
this purpose, overly restrictive SOP laws can have the opposite effect by inhibiting 
the ability of qualified APRNs and PAs to care for patients. Clinical research has 
shown that, within their training and education, APRNs and PAs can provide care 
that equals or exceeds that provided by physicians,8 and recent economic analyses 
have demonstrated that restrictive SOP laws can function as anticompetitive 
restraints that protect physicians in markets for healthcare services at the expense of 
patients.9 Studies within this latter strand of research have found evidence of harm 
typical of anticompetitive restrictions, including higher prices, reduced access to 
 
 
 3. Grant R. Martsolf, Hilary Barnes, Michael R. Richards, Kristin N. Ray, Heather M. 
Brom & Matthew D. McHugh, Employment of Advanced Practice Clinicians in Physician 
Practices, 178 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 988, 988–89 (2018).  
 4. David I. Auerbach, Will the NP Workforce Grow in the Future? New Forecasts and 
Implications for Healthcare Delivery, 50 MED. CARE 606, 607–08 (2012); Thomas 
Kippenbrock, Wen-Juo Lo, Ellen Odell & Bill Buron, The Southern States: NPs Made an 
Impact in Rural and Healthcare Shortage Areas, 27 J. AM. ASS’N NURSE PRAC. 707, 710–13 
(2015); Benjamin J. McMichael, Beyond Physicians: The Effect of Licensing and Liability 
Laws on the Supply of Nurse Practitioners and Physician Assistants, 15 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 732, 759–64 (2018); Ying Xue, James S. Goodwin, Deepak Adhikari, Mukaila A. Raji 
& Yong-Fang Kuo, Trends in Primary Care Provision to Medicare Beneficiaries by 
Physicians, Nurse Practitioners, or Physician Assistants: 2008–2014, 8 J. PRIMARY CARE & 
COMMUNITY HEALTH 256, 260 (2017).  
 5. See McMichael, supra note 4, at 734–37 (discussing the state variation in the legal 
authority of APRNs and PAs). 
 6. See Barbara J. Safriet, Closing the Gap Between Can and May in Health-Care 
Providers’ Scopes of Practice: A Primer for Policymakers, 19 YALE J. REG. 301, 317–23 
(2002) (discussing SOP laws generally); see also McMichael, supra note 4, at 734–37 
(discussing the SOP laws governing nurse practitioners and PAs).  
 7. Morris M. Kleiner, Enhancing Quality or Restricting Competition: The Case of 
Licensing Public School Teachers, 5 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 3, 8 (2010) (“The 
general rationale for licensing is the health and safety of consumers. Beyond that, the quality 
of service delivery . . . [is] sometimes invoked.”). 
 8. See DANIEL J. GILMAN & TARA ISA KOSLOV, FTC, POLICY PERSPECTIVES: 
COMPETITION AND THE REGULATION OF ADVANCED PRACTICE NURSES 27–35 (2014) 
(reviewing the existing evidence).  
 9. See, e.g., E. KATHLEEN ADAMS & SARA MARKOWITZ, HAMILTON PROJECT, IMPROVING 
EFFICIENCY IN THE HEALTH-CARE SYSTEM: REMOVING ANTICOMPETITIVE BARRIERS FOR 
ADVANCED PRACTICE REGISTERED NURSES AND PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS 5–11 (2018) 
(discussing the anticompetitive nature of many SOP laws).  
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healthcare services, and changes in how care is provided.10 Based on this evidence, 
multiple national organizations, including the National Academy of Medicine, have 
called on states to relax their SOP laws.11 Both the Obama and Trump 
Administrations have issued similar recommendations.12 A minority of states have 
heeded these calls, but the ongoing debate and political battle over SOP laws has 
only intensified over the last decade.13 Physician organizations, in particular, 
vigorously oppose the relaxation of these laws—often on grounds of promoting 
patient safety.14  
As important as the debate over SOP laws is, it has so far excluded a meaningful 
discussion of a parallel legal mechanism which can both accomplish the same goals 
as SOP laws (i.e., promote patient safety) and modulate the effect these laws have 
on healthcare providers. Specifically, APRNs and PAs may be sued for malpractice 
just as physicians and other professionals may be.15 And a large body of evidence 
 
 
 10. See Morris M. Kleiner, Allison Marier, Kyoung Won Park & Coady Wing, Relaxing 
Occupational Licensing Requirements: Analyzing Wages and Prices for a Medical Service, 
59 J.L. & ECON. 261, 274–77 (2016) (showing that restrictive SOP laws raise prices); Sara 
Markowitz, E. Kathleen Adams, Mary Jane Lewitt & Anne L. Dunlop, Competitive Effects of 
Scope of Practice Restrictions: Public Health or Public Harm?, 55 J. HEALTH ECON. 201, 
209–16 (2017) (demonstrating that restrictive SOP laws induce changes in how care is 
delivered); McMichael, supra note 4, at 759–64 (finding that restrictive SOP laws inhibit 
access to healthcare).  
 11. These organizations include, among others, the National Academy of Medicine 
(formerly the Institute of Medicine), the National Governors Association, and the American 
Association of Retired People. AMANDA DUNKER, ESTHER KROFAH & FREDERICK ISASI, 
NATIONAL GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION, THE ROLE OF PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS IN HEALTH CARE 
DELIVERY 1 (2014); INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF NURSING: LEADING CHANGE, ADVANCING 
HEALTH 3–6 (2011); MARIA SCHIFF, THE ROLE OF NURSE PRACTITIONERS IN MEETING 
INCREASING DEMANDS FOR PRIMARY CARE 1 (2012); Jo Ann Jenkins, Advanced Practice 
Nurses Play an Essential Role in Health Care, AARP (May 10, 2018), https://www.aarp.org 
/health/health-insurance/info-2018/advanced-practice-nurses-healthcare.html [https://perma 
.cc/JYU2-D5A8].  
 12. U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., U.S. DEP’T TREASURY & U.S. DEP’T LAB., 
REFORMING AMERICA’S HEALTHCARE SYSTEM THROUGH CHOICE AND COMPETITION 31–36 
(2018); U.S. DEP’T TREASURY OFF. ECON. POL’Y, COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS & U.S. DEP’T 
LAB., OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK FOR POLICYMAKERS 13–14 (2015).  
 13. See Benjamin J. McMichael, The Demand for Healthcare Regulation: The Effect of 
Political Spending on Occupational Licensing Laws, 84 S. ECON. J. 297, 299–301, 306–09 
(2017) (providing information on states that have relaxed their SOP laws and evidence that 
political spending at the state level drives changes in these laws).  
 14. See, e.g., AMA, Memorial Resolutions Adopted Unanimously 238 (2017), 
https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/ama-assn.org/files/corp/media-browser/public/hod/i17-
resolutions.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6SR-9Y8L] (“Resolution 214. APRN Compact . . .Our 
[American Medical Association], in the public interest, opposes enactment of legislation to 
authorize the independent practice of medicine by any individual who has not completed the 
state’s requirements for licensure to engage in the practice of medicine and surgery in all of 
its branches.”); see also infra Section IV.C (reviewing the debate over SOP laws in detail).  
 15. Benjamin J. McMichael, Barbara J. Safriet & Peter I. Buerhaus, The Extraregulatory 
Effect of Nurse Practitioner Scope-of-Practice Laws on Physician Malpractice Rates, 75 MED. 
CARE RES. & REV. 312, 313, 315–17 (2018).  
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has demonstrated that tort liability can impact how providers deliver care, including 
deterring them from providing unsafe care.16 For example, recent empirical research 
has found that tort reforms, which decrease the liability risk faced by providers, can 
reduce the incentives to invest in patient safety and increase the rate at which 
preventable medical complications occur, suggesting that tort liability effectively 
deters providers.17 While tort liability can result in overdeterrence, which may induce 
the practice of defensive medicine—providing unnecessary treatment to avoid 
liability—existing evidence is clear that malpractice liability influences how 
providers care for patients.18 Research on the deterrent effect exerted by tort law has 
focused almost exclusively on physicians, but APRNs and PAs may respond 
similarly to physicians when faced with the threat of malpractice liability, as prior 
work has demonstrated the similarity of care delivered by physicians, APRNs, and 
PAs.19 Given the demonstrated ability of tort law to deter the provision of unsafe 
care, the debate over SOP laws and the necessity of these laws to ensure patient 
safety requires a simultaneous discussion of malpractice liability.  
More importantly, however, evaluating SOP laws and malpractice liability 
alongside one another is necessary because these two legal regimes may interact to 
affect the delivery of healthcare by APRNs, PAs, and physicians. In particular, 
restrictive SOP laws require that APRNs and PAs work closely with physicians—
often explicitly mandating physician supervision of APRNs and PAs.20 This close 
relationship may better enable patients injured as a result of negligence involving 
APRNs and PAs to hold physicians liable under a variety of legal doctrines, 
 
 
 16. See, e.g., Ronen Avraham & Max Schanzenbach, The Impact of Tort Reform on 
Intensity of Treatment: Evidence from Heart Patients, 39 J. HEALTH ECON. 273, 273 (2015) 
(“We conclude that tort reform reduces treatment intensity overall, even though it changes the 
mix of treatments.”); Janet Currie & W. Bentley MacLeod, First Do No Harm? Tort Reform 
and Birth Outcomes, 123 Q.J. ECON. 795, 795 (2008) (“We find that reform of the Joint and 
Several Liability rule (or the ‘deep pockets rule’) reduces complications of labor and 
procedure use, whereas caps on noneconomic damages increase them.”).  
 17. Bernard S. Black, Amy R. Wagner & Zenon Zabinski, The Association Between 
Patient Safety Indicators and Medical Malpractice Risk: Evidence from Florida and Texas, 3 
AM. J. HEALTH ECON. 109, 109 (2017); Toshiaki Iizuka, Does Higher Malpractice Pressure 
Deter Medical Errors, 56 J.L. & ECON. 161, 163 (2013). 
 18. See Michael Frakes & Anupam B. Jena, Does Medical Malpractice Law Improve 
Health Care Quality?, 143 J. PUB. ECON. 142, 157–58 (2016) (defining and discussing 
defensive medicine). See generally MICHELLE M. MELLO & ALLEN KACHALIA, MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE: EVIDENCE ON REFORM ALTERNATIVES AND CLAIMS INVOLVING ELDERLY 
PATIENTS (2016) (providing an extensive review of the available evidence on malpractice 
liability and the provision of healthcare).  
 19. See, e.g., MARYJOAN D. LADDEN & SUSAN B. HASSMILLER, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON 
FOUND., IMPROVING PATIENT ACCESS TO HIGH-QUALITY CARE: HOW TO FULLY UTILIZE THE 
SKILLS, KNOWLEDGE, AND EXPERIENCE OF ADVANCED PRACTICE REGISTERED NURSES 8 (2013) 
(noting that “[h]ealth outcomes are comparable for patients treated by primary care NPs and 
MDs . . . .”).  
 20. Markowitz et al., supra note 10, at 203–04; McMichael, supra note 13, at 299–301, 
306–09. 
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including vicarious liability doctrines.21 In general, physicians can expect to face 
higher liability costs when APRNs and PAs face restrictive SOP laws because 
patients will find it easier to hold physicians liable for errors related to APRNs and 
PAs. Similarly, because some patients will choose to pursue physicians instead of 
APRNs and PAs when SOP laws are restrictive, APRNs and PAs can expect to face 
lower liability costs. The liability cost shifting induced by restrictive SOP laws has 
important implications for healthcare delivery based on prior work showing that 
liability costs influence how providers care for patients.22  
The purpose of this Article is to provide the first empirical evidence on the joint 
role of malpractice liability and SOP laws in the provision of healthcare and, in so 
doing, coalesce the debates over these two legal regimes. Prior work has shown that 
allowing APRNs to practice without physician supervision can lower the rate at 
which physicians pay out malpractice settlements and verdicts by as much as 31%.23 
However, no evidence exists on the joint role that SOP laws and malpractice liability 
play in the delivery of healthcare. The absence of this evidence is particularly 
problematic because the effect individual laws have on the provision of healthcare is 
an important point of contention in the ongoing debate over SOP laws.  
Throughout the empirical analysis, I focus on the provision of obstetric care 
during childbirth, particularly the method of delivery chosen.24 According to the 
World Health Organization, the rate of births via caesarean section (“C-section”) in 
the United States is currently three times the recommended rate, which places both 
mothers and infants at risk.25 Thus, obstetric care is a critically important context in 
which to examine the patient-safety implications of both SOP laws and malpractice 
liability. To do so, I analyze the effect of changes in the SOP laws governing APRNs 
and PAs across states with different levels of malpractice pressure as measured by 
the malpractice insurance premiums paid by physicians in that state.26 If malpractice 
liability modulates the way SOP laws affect how physicians, APRNs, and PAs 
provide care, then changes in SOP laws will have different effects on the provision 
of obstetric care in states with high and low levels of malpractice pressure.  
I analyze a restricted-use dataset obtained from the National Center for Health 
Statistics (NCHS), which contains details on every recorded birth in the United States 
 
 
 21. McMichael et al., supra note 15, at 315–17 (discussing the various legal doctrines 
that allow plaintiffs to more easily establish physician liability when a state maintains 
restrictive SOP laws).  
 22. See Y. Tony Yang, David M. Studdert, S. V. Subramanian & Michelle M. Mello, 
Does Tort Law Improve the Health of Newborns, or Miscarry? A Longitudinal Analysis of the 
Effect of Liability Pressure on Birth Outcomes, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 217, 231–36 
(2012) (finding that providers alter their behavior in response to changes in liability risk). 
 23. McMichael et al., supra note 15 at 321.  
 24. Markowitz et al., supra note 10, at 209–16. 
 25. AP Betrán, MR Torloni, JJ Zhang & AM Gulmezoglu, WHO Statement on Caesarean 
Section Rates, 123 BJOG 667, 667 (2015). 
 26. I use the term “malpractice pressure” throughout this article to refer generally to the 
risk of malpractice liability. Doing so better captures the function of risk in this context—
pressuring providers to perform certain procedures—and is consistent with prior research in 
this area. See, e.g., Iizuka, supra note 17, at 161 (using the term “pressure” to refer to 
malpractice liability risk).  
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between 1998 and 2015. The primary empirical models contain over 69 million 
observations, and because the dataset is the same one used in the calculation of the 
official birth statistics by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),27 
the empirical results here represent the best available evidence on the roles of SOP 
laws and malpractice liability in the delivery of obstetric care.  
In general, the empirical analysis reveals that the degree of malpractice pressure 
modulates the effect that SOP laws have on the provision of healthcare. For example, 
consistent with prior work,28 I find that allowing APRNs and PAs to practice with 
more autonomy reduces the use of medically intensive procedures in labor and 
delivery, including delivery via C-section. Extending the analysis, I find that relaxing 
SOP laws reduces C-sections when malpractice pressure is low but has almost no 
effect when malpractice pressure is high. I find similar results for other outcomes, 
including medical inductions of labor. These results suggest SOP laws impact the 
delivery of healthcare differently across different levels of malpractice pressure. 
The evidence developed in the empirical analysis demonstrates a clear and 
pervasive interaction between SOP laws and malpractice liability, and this 
interaction has a salient effect on the provision of healthcare. Thus, the analysis 
demonstrates the importance of considering the role of malpractice liability 
alongside SOP laws in the continued debate over the necessity of these laws. More 
importantly, the results of the analysis point to a potential resolution to the 
increasingly heated debate over SOP laws. Tort law and SOP laws share the goals of 
protecting patient safety and promoting the delivery of high-quality healthcare, even 
if they differ in their approaches to achieving these goals. However, because 
restrictive SOP laws effectively shift liability risk from APRNs and PAs to 
physicians, these laws necessarily distort the incentives to provide safe and high-
quality care created by tort law.  
Based on the empirical analysis, which bears out this distortion of incentives, I 
join the National Academy of Medicine and others in calling for the elimination of 
restrictive SOP laws. Importantly, however, my recommendation differs from prior 
calls to abrogate these laws by providing, in tort law, a specific alternative 
mechanism on which states can rely to accomplish the goal that justified the 
introduction of SOP laws in the first place—ensuring patient safety. The empirical 
evidence presented here demonstrates that tort law exerts a deterrent effect on 
APRNs and PAs and that this effect is stronger when they bear more of their own 
liability risk in the absence of restrictive SOP laws. While the medical malpractice 
system as currently implemented is far from perfect and efforts to reform it should 
certainly continue,29 malpractice liability can deter individual providers and can do 
 
 
 27. See, e.g., Joyce A. Martin, Brady E. Hamilton, Michelle J.K. Osterman, Anne K. 
Driscoll & T.J. Mathews, Births: Final Data for 2015, 66 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP. 1, 2–3 
(2017) (using the same dataset as that used here).  
 28. See Markowitz et al., supra note 10, at 216 (finding that relaxed SOP laws lead to 
“lower observed probabilities of labor inductions, C-sections, apparent elective inductions, 
and apparent elective C-sections relative to states with [restrictive SOP laws]”).  
 29. See, e.g., Yang et al., supra note 22, at 218 (explaining that “[d]efensive medicine is 
deterrence gone awry” and noting that its practice may be induced by the current malpractice 
system). Based on the nature of the analysis presented here, the extent to which providers 
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so without generating the substantial harms to patients that prior work has attributed 
to restrictive SOP laws (e.g., impeding access to care and raising the costs of care).30  
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I discusses healthcare providers and the 
SOP laws that govern them. Part II provides an overview of the malpractice liability 
these providers may face. Part III empirically investigates the roles that these two 
seemingly disparate, but intimately related, legal regimes play in the provision of 
healthcare. Part IV discusses the primary policy implications of this analysis and uses 
the results of the analysis to provide a new path forward in resolving the heated and 
ongoing debate over SOP laws. An online technical appendix provides the 
econometric details of the main analysis and offers relevant supplementary 
analyses.31  
I. LICENSING HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS  
While physicians have historically delivered most of the healthcare in the United 
States, this trend has changed recently, with APRNs and PAs providing more care 
traditionally reserved to physicians.32 Indeed, the growth rates for APRNs and PAs 
significantly outstrip those for physicians—particularly in primary care specialties 
where the physician shortage is most acute—suggesting that APRNs and PAs will 
only deliver a greater proportion of care in the United States going forward.33 This 
Part first provides an overview of APRNs, PAs, and their roles in providing care, 
with a focus on obstetric care. It then details the SOP laws that govern these providers 
and engages with the existing evidence on the effects these laws have on APRNs, 
PAs, their patients, and the healthcare system.  
 
 
practice defensive medicine is beyond the scope of this Article. Future work can investigate 
the extent of defensive medicine in more detail.  
 30. See Kleiner et al., supra note 10, at 276–77 (highlighting the propensity of restrictive 
SOP laws to increase the price of healthcare); McMichael, supra note 4, at 759–64 
(highlighting the propensity of restrictive SOP laws to impede access to healthcare).  
 31. Benjamin J. McMichael, Healthcare Licensing and Liability: Technical Appendix (U. 
Ala. Legal Stud., Res. Paper No. 3357906, 2019) [hereinafter Technical Appendix], 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3357906 [https://perma.cc/ST3V-
HYLW]. 
 32. David I. Auerbach, Douglas O. Staiger & Peter I. Buerhaus, Growing Ranks of 
Advanced Practice Clinicians—Implications for the Physician Workforce, 378 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 2358, 2358 (2018) (“A growing share of health care services are being provided by 
advanced practice registered nurses (APRNs), particularly nurse practitioners (NPs), who 
make up the majority of APRNs, and by physician assistants (PAs).”).  
 33. E. Kathleen Adams & Sara Markowitz, Loosening Restrictions on the Scope of 
Practice for PAs, 32 J. AM. ACAD. PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS 8, 8 (2019) (“The growth in the 
supply of PAs between 2016 and 2026 is projected to exceed that of [nurse practitioners] and 
indeed, all diagnosing and health-treating practitioners.”); Edward Salsberg, Changes in the 
Pipeline of New NPs and RNs: Implications for Health Care Delivery and Educational 
Capacity, HEALTH AFF.: HEALTH AFF. BLOG (June 5, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do 
/10.1377/hblog20180524.993081/full/ [https://perma.cc/78XT-F4H9] (“The number of new 
nurse practitioners (NPs) graduating each year continues to rise rapidly and will likely exceed 
the annual number of new physicians completing training in the next few years.”).  
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A. Advanced Practice Registered Nurses and Physician Assistants 
APRNs are registered nurses who have undergone additional training—typically 
completing a master’s degree or professional doctorate—and practice in a wide 
variety of medical specialties. The term “APRN” includes four different types of 
nursing professionals: nurse practitioners (NPs), certified nurse midwives (CNMs), 
certified registered nurse anesthetists (CRNAs), and clinical nurse specialists 
(CNSs).34 NPs and CNSs practice in a wide range of specialties,35 while CNMs and 
CRNAs practice almost exclusively in obstetrics/gynecology and anesthesiology, 
respectively.36 PAs are healthcare professionals who have completed training—
usually resulting in a graduate degree—to provide healthcare in different 
specialties.37 Both APRNs and PAs may diagnose and treat patients, order and 
interpret tests, and write prescriptions.38  
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, there were approximately 180,000 
NPs, 6300 CNMs, 44,000 CRNAs, and 115,000 PAs practicing in 2018.39 Compared 
to physicians, APRNs and PAs are more likely to practice in primary care and to 
provide care to underserved populations, including Medicaid beneficiaries.40 APRNs 
and PAs currently outnumber family and general practice physicians and are the 
principal source of care in some parts of the country.41 While APRNs and PAs 
receive relatively less formal training than physicians—eighteen months to three 
years for the former and upwards of seven to eight years for the latter—they function 
similarly to physicians in a variety of healthcare settings.42 And there is a near 
consensus in the clinical literature that, when providing care within the scope of their 
education and training, the healthcare outcomes of APRNs and PAs equal or exceed 
those of physicians.43 To be sure, APRNs and PAs complete less training than 
 
 
 34. ADAMS & MARKOWITZ, supra note 9, at 9.  
 35. NPs tend to focus more specifically on patient care and can prescribe medications, 
while CNSs generally focus on patient care, management, and administration and often do not 
prescribe medications. Nurse Practitioner vs. Clinical Nurse Specialist, NP SCHOOLS, 
https://www.nursepractitionerschools.com/faq/np-vs-cns [https://perma.cc/7C4Q-494U].  
 36. Certified Nurse Midwife, NURSE, https://nurse.org/resources/certified-nurse-midwife/ 
[https://perma.cc/B338-X9LN]; Nurse Anesthetist, NURSE, https://nurse.org/resources/nurse-
anesthetist/ [https://perma.cc/E8TB-9YLG].  
 37. ADAMS & MARKOWITZ, supra note 9, at 8–9.  
 38. Id. at 8–10; McMichael, supra note 4, at 734–35.  
 39. The Bureau of Labor Statistics does not separately count CNSs. Occupational 
Employment Statistics: May 2018 Occupation Profiles, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., 
https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes_stru.htm#29-0000 [https://perma.cc/K2LT-QDFJ].  
 40. Peter I. Buerhaus, Catherine M. DesRoches, Robert Dittus & Karen Donelan, 
Practice Characteristics of Primary Care Nurse Practitioners and Physicians, 63 NURSING 
OUTLOOK 144, 144–53 (2015); McMichael, supra note 4, at 759–64; Kevin Stange, How Does 
Provider Supply and Regulation Influence Health Care Markets? Evidence from Nurse 
Practitioners and Physician Assistants, 33 J. HEALTH ECON. 1, 1–3 (2014).  
 41. Auerbach, supra note 4, at 607–608; Auerbach et al., supra note 32, at 2358–59.  
 42. ADAMS & MARKOWITZ, supra note 9, at 8–10; McMichael, supra note 4, at 734–36.  
 43. See generally MIRANDA LAURANT, MIEKE VAN DER BIEZEN, NANCY WIJERS, 
Kanokwaroon WATANANIRUN, EVANGELOS KONTOPANTELIS & ANNEKE JAH VAN VUGHT, 
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physicians and therefore cannot provide all of the services delivered by physicians—
they do not, for example, perform major surgery. However, within certain healthcare 
settings—primary care being the prime example—APRNs and PAs perform similar 
functions as physicians with similar patient outcomes.44  
Both APRNs and PAs deliver obstetric and gynecological care. Recent work 
estimated that CNMs, NPs specializing in women’s health, and PAs make up 
approximately 18%, 15%, and 2% of the women’s health workforce, respectively.45 
Conducting a systematic review of studies involving comparisons between CNMs 
and physicians, a large team of clinicians and researchers led by Meg Johantgen 
concluded that CNMs employ interventions, such as epidurals and medical induction 
of labor, less than physicians but that infant health outcomes do not differ across 
CNMs and physicians.46 Women’s health NPs (and other types of NPs) do not 
provide obstetric care as CNMs do—they do not generally participate in labor and 
delivery—but they do provide other services, including prenatal care, that can 
ultimately affect obstetric outcomes (e.g., by intervening early to prevent or stop 
preterm labor).47 Similarly, PAs do not participate in obstetric care to the same extent 
as CNMs, but they are trained to provide neonatal and obstetric/gynecological care.48 
And PAs may provide some services that overlap with CNMs, such as labor 
management and normal deliveries.49  
Of note is the fact that APRNs and PAs do not, themselves, perform C-sections.50 
As major surgery, this would be outside the training of APRNs and PAs, though they 
could certainly assist with the surgery and may be involved in the initial stages of 
labor prior to the C-section. If an APRN or PA is initially responsible for a normal 
delivery and later determines that the patient requires a C-section, the APRN or PA 
would refer the patient to a physician. As noted in a recent study by Sara Markowitz 
and colleagues, this decision of whether and when to refer a patient for a C-section 
is sensitive to the SOP laws governing providers.51 These laws may also impair 
access to APRNs and PAs by discouraging these providers from practicing in certain 
 
 
NURSES AS SUBSTITUTES FOR DOCTORS IN PRIMARY CARE (REVIEW) (2019) (reviewing the 
available evidence); GILMAN & KOSLOV, supra note 8 (same).  
 44. LAURANT ET AL., supra note 43, at 2–3.  
 45. Oren Berkowitz & Susan E. White, An Opportunity for PAs as Obstetrical Laborists, 
31 J. AM. ACAD. PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS 40, 40 (2018).  
 46. Meg Johantgen, Lily Fountain, George Zangaro, Robin Newhouse, Julie Stanik-Hutt 
& Kathleen White, Comparison of Labor and Delivery Care Provided by Certified Nurse-
Midwives and Physicians: A Systematic Review, 1990 to 2008, 22 WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES 
e73, e75–80 (2012).  
 47. Berkowitz & White, supra note 45, at 40–42; Jennifer Doyle & Angela Silber, 
Preterm Labor: Role of the Nurse Practitioner, 40 NURSE PRACTITIONER 49, 50–54 (2015).  
 48. Kelly Donkers, Judy Truscott, Carl Garrubba & Deborah DeLong, High-Fidelity 
Simulation Use in Preparation of Physician Assistant Students for Neonatal and Obstetric 
Care, 27 J. PHYSICIAN ASSISTANT EDUC. 68, 68–72 (2016); Tamara S. Ritsema & Amy M. 
Klingler, Can PAs Help Address the Pressing Public Health Problem of Rising Maternal 
Mortality?, 31 J. AM. ACAD. PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS 11, 11–12 (2018).  
 49. Berkowitz & White, supra note 45, at 40–42.  
 50. Id.  
 51. Markowitz et al., supra note 10, at 216. 
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areas.52 This impaired access, in turn, may affect C-section rates because APRNs and 
PAs may steer patients away from C-sections to a greater extent than physicians.53 
The next subsection provides more details on SOP laws.  
B. Scope-of-Practice Laws  
While APRNs and PAs function similarly to physicians and achieve comparable 
healthcare outcomes among their patients, they—unlike physicians—face 
substantial state variation in the occupational licensing laws that govern how they 
may provide care.54 Occupational licensing laws govern many aspects of APRN and 
PA practices, but the most important subset of these laws are the SOP laws that 
determine what services APRNs and PAs may provide and under what conditions 
they may provide them. Prior work has classified APRN and PA SOP laws in 
different ways.55 While each classification scheme has its own advantages and 
disadvantages, I follow a version of the scheme provided in two recent studies that 
relied on specific statutory and regulatory language (instead of secondary sources) 
to classify individual state SOP laws.56 This approach to classification minimizes the 
risk of inconsistent statutory and regulatory interpretation, which may occur when 
relying on various secondary sources. It also isolates specific SOP laws that 
policymakers may focus on changing in the future, instead of considering a broad 
range of disparate laws to arrive at overly general—and potentially less useful to 
policymakers—categorizations of SOP laws.57  
In particular, the approach adopted here focuses on both the physician supervision 
requirements imposed on APRNs and PAs and the prescriptive authority granted to 
APRNs and PAs, thereby isolating the specific laws that have the largest impacts on 
the care delivered by APRNs and PAs.58 I classify a state as allowing “APRN 
independence” if it (1) requires no physician supervision of APRNs and (2) grants 
APRNs full prescriptive authority (i.e., effectively places no more restrictions on 
 
 
 52. McMichael, supra note 4, at 749–59.  
 53. Id. 
 54. See Safriet, supra note 6, at 317–23 (providing an overview of SOP laws).  
 55. For example, Sara Markowitz and colleagues considered a variety of restrictions on 
CNMs to broadly classify states as having “no barriers” to CNMs providing care, “low 
barriers,” “moderate barriers,” or “high barriers.” Markowitz et al., supra note 10, at 203–04. 
In contrast, a study led by Morris Kleiner focused on physician supervision requirements as 
they pertain to prescriptions and classified the SOP laws governing NPs by whether they 
allowed “limited prescription authority,” “supervised or delegated prescription authority,” or 
“independent prescription authority.” Kleiner et al., supra note 10, at 266–67.  
 56. See McMichael, supra note 4, at 734–37 (discussing the classification of SOP laws); 
McMichael, supra note 13, at 299 (same).  
 57. This is not to suggest that other classification schemes are “wrong.” Indeed, though 
they focus on somewhat different statutes and regulations, the ultimate classification schemes 
used in prior work are often highly correlated with one another. Compare Markowitz et al., 
supra note 10, at 203–04, and Kleiner et al., supra note 10, at 266–67, with McMichael, supra 
note 4, at 734–37.  
 58. Other SOP laws may affect APRNs and PAs, but laws such as the ability to sign death 
certificates or issue handicap placards have smaller impacts on the ability of APRNs and PAs 
to care for patients generally.  
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APRNs’ prescriptive authority than on physicians’).59 Similarly, I classify a state as 
allowing “PA autonomy” 60 if it (1) allows PAs to practice at remote sites with visits 
from their supervising physicians required no more than monthly and (2) grants PAs 
full prescriptive authority (i.e., effectively places no more restrictions on PAs than 
on physicians).61  
This categorization of laws also has the advantage of focusing specifically on the 
SOP laws that are most salient in connecting APRNs and PAs to physicians. These 
connections are critically important for evaluating the role of malpractice liability as 
described in detail below.62 Table A1 in the Technical Appendix provides an 
overview of state SOP laws between 1998 and 2015—the beginning and end of the 
period considered here.63 With respect to the SOP laws considered here, two details 
are particularly important. First, while the trend has been decidedly in favor of 
granting APRNs and PAs more autonomy and authority, states do not relax the SOP 
laws governing APRNs and PAs simultaneously, so the patterns of changes in the 
laws for APRNs and PAs are different.64 Second, while these laws come from prior 
work focusing on NPs and not APRNs generally, a review of the statutory language 
confirms that the laws considered here apply to CNMs as well as NPs.65 Although 
these laws do not apply to CRNAs and CNSs, these providers play smaller roles in 
the provision of obstetric and gynecological care, and are therefore not the focus of 
the analysis presented here.66 Accordingly, the results pertaining to APRN SOP laws 
reported below should be interpreted in the context of NPs and CNMs as opposed to 
all four types of APRNs.  
The current literature on occupational licensing laws focuses heavily on the role 
these laws play in professional labor markets and healthcare output markets, with 
relatively little emphasis on SOP laws or the effect of these laws on the provision of 
healthcare. For example, several studies have considered the effects of licensing laws 
on the labor market outcomes (including earnings and hours worked) of NPs, PAs, 
and physicians.67 Generally, NP earnings increase and physician earnings decrease 
 
 
 59. McMichael, supra note 4, at 734–37; McMichael, supra note 13, at 299. 
 60. For ease of exposition, I refer to PAs as practicing autonomously; however, they are 
never allowed to practice without some level of physician involvement.  
 61. McMichael, supra note 4, at 734–37; McMichael, supra note 13, at 299. 
 62. See infra Section II.B.  
 63. Technical Appendix, supra note 31.  
 64. McMichael, supra note 4, at 734–37.  
 65. Overall, statutes generally treat CNMs and NPs the same, with a few exceptions that 
are often limited to the prescriptive authority of CNMs while actively caring for laboring 
mothers in a hospital. See Markowitz et al., supra note 10, at 203–04; McMichael, supra note 
4, at 734–37.  
 66. I do not mean to suggest that CRNAs and CNSs play no role in obstetric care. CRNAs 
often provide anesthesia services in labor and delivery settings, and CNSs may play important 
roles in managing pre-, peri-, and postnatal care. The roles of CRNAs and CNSs warrant future 
investigation. However, these providers are not the focus of this study since they do not 
provide obstetric and gynecological care to the extent that the other providers considered here 
do and are not generally considered part of the women’s health workforce. See Berkowitz & 
White, supra note 45, at 40–42.  
 67. See, e.g., Michael J. Dueker, Ada K. Jacox, David E. Kalist & Stephen J. Spurr, The 
Practice Boundaries of Advanced Practice Nurses: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 27 J. 
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when the former gain greater authority and independence from the latter.68 
Consistent with this evidence, prior research examining the effect of different 
licensing and SOP laws on the supplies of APRNs and PAs has found evidence that 
more of these providers practice in areas with less restrictive SOP laws.69  
With respect to output markets, multiple studies have confirmed that granting NPs 
and PAs greater authority leads to reduced prices and lower healthcare 
expenditures.70 In particular, the price of a common medical examination decreases 
by 3% to 16% when NPs gain greater independence,71 the savings achieved by using 
retail health clinics instead of emergency departments are higher when NPs have 
more independence,72 and Medicaid costs either decrease or remain flat when NPs 
and PAs are granted more authority.73 Kevin Stange found that a greater supply of 
NPs and PAs had relatively little impact on the office-based healthcare market. 
However, he concluded that healthcare markets are more responsive to changes in 
NP and PA supply when these providers possess more autonomy, suggesting that 
restrictive SOP laws may blunt the effect NPs and PAs can have on healthcare 
markets.74 
 
 
REG. ECON. 309, 309 (2005) (“We find that in States where APNs have acquired a substantial 
amount of professional independence, the earnings of APNs are substantially lower, and those 
of physicians’ assistants (PAs) are substantially higher, than in other States.”); Kleiner et al., 
supra note 10, at 261 (“We find that when nurse practitioners have more independence in their 
scope of practice, their wages are higher but physicians’ wages are lower . . . .”); John J. Perry, 
The Rise and Impact of Nurse Practitioners and Physician Assistants on Their Own and Cross-
Occupation Incomes, 27 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 491, 491 (2009) (“It is found that changes in 
NP and PA regulatory authority do impact the labor markets of [NPs, PAs, and physicians].”).  
 68. Kleiner et al., supra note 10, at 261.  
 69. See, e.g., McMichael, supra note 4, at 732 (“Relaxing licensing laws to allow NPs to 
practice with less physician oversight increases the supply of NPs in areas with few practicing 
physicians by 60 percent . . . .”); Patricia B. Reagan & Pamela J. Salsberry, The Effects of 
State-Level Scope-of-Practice Regulations on the Number and Growth of Nurse Practitioners, 
61 NURSING OUTLOOK 392, 392 (2013) (“Restrictive [SOP laws] reduced the number of NPs 
by about 10 per 100,000 and reduced the growth rate by 25%.”). 
 70. The literature on occupational licensing laws is not limited to APRNs and PAs. See, 
e.g., EDWARD J. TIMMONS, JASON M. HOCKENBERRY & CHRISTINE PIETTE DURRANCE, 
MERCATUS RES., MORE BATTLES AMONG LICENSED OCCUPATIONS: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS 
OF SCOPE OF PRACTICE AND DIRECT ACCESS ON THE CHIROPRACTIC, PHYSICAL THERAPIST, AND 
PHYSICIAN LABOR MARKET 18–19, 25 (2016) (examining the laws governing chiropractors, 
physical therapists, and physicians); Morris M. Kleiner & Kyoung Won Park, Battles Among 
Licensed Occupations: Analyzing Government Regulations on Labor Market Outcomes for 
Dentists and Hygienists 19–20 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16560, 
2010) (examining dentists and dental hygienists).  
 71. Kleiner et al., supra note 10, at 276–77.  
 72. Joanne Spetz, Stephen T. Parente, Robert J. Town & Dawn Bazarko, Scope-Of-
Practice Laws for Nurse Practitioners Limit Cost Savings That Can Be Achieved in Retail 
Clinics, 32 HEALTH AFF. 1977, 1980–82 (2013).  
 73. Edward Joseph Timmons, The Effects of Expanded Nurse Practitioner and Physician 
Assistant Scope of Practice on the Cost of Medicaid Patient Care, 121 HEALTH POL’Y 189, 
193–95 (2017).  
 74. Stange, supra note 40, at 9–15. 
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Relatedly, recent work has found that relaxing SOP laws can result in greater 
access to care and increased utilization of primary care services. For example, 
relaxing SOP laws increases access to healthcare most in the counties that have the 
least access to care,75 and NPs treat more Medicare patients in states with less 
restrictive SOP laws.76 Conducting a wide-ranging study, Jeffrey Traczynski and 
Victoria Udalova found that granting NPs more autonomy increases access to care, 
lowers barriers to care, increases self-reported quality of care, increases the use of 
medical care in underserved populations, reduces the use of emergency departments 
for primary care, and reduces healthcare costs by up to 1.3%.77  
Perhaps most related to the analysis presented below is the recent study conducted 
by Markowitz and colleagues.78 Focusing on obstetric care, the Markowitz team 
found that SOP laws have few effects on maternal health behaviors or infant health 
outcomes.79 However, states with less restrictive laws have lower rates of labor 
inductions and C-sections (including elective inductions and C-sections), suggesting 
that relaxing SOP laws leads to the provision of lower intensity care with no 
offsetting costs in terms of health outcomes.80 The analysis presented below extends 
the work of the Markowitz team by examining a potential mechanism which may 
interact with SOP laws to affect the provision of healthcare—malpractice liability. 
As discussed in detail below, the malpractice pressure exerted on different types of 
providers may vary depending on the SOP laws in place because these laws may 
shift liability for medical errors between different providers.81 Additionally, this 
study builds on the work of Traczynski and Udalova and the Markowitz group by 
examining both APRNs and PAs—with the notable exception of the 2014 study 
conducted by Stange, most of the work on SOP laws has excluded PAs from 
consideration.82  
II. HOLDING HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS LIABLE  
Like physicians and other professionals, APRNs and PAs may be held liable for 
malpractice when they negligently injure patients. And prior work has demonstrated 
the potential of malpractice liability to substantially impact healthcare providers, the 
healthcare system, and the provision of care. However, despite a robust debate over 
the importance of malpractice liability in the healthcare system, malpractice liability 
is rarely, if ever, mentioned in the debate over SOP laws. This Part engages with the 
evidence on the effect of malpractice liability on the healthcare system, with a focus 
on obstetric care, before tracing the legal connections between liability and SOP 
 
 
 75. McMichael, supra note 4, at 744–45.  
 76. Yong-Fang Kuo, Figaro L. Loresto Jr., Linda R. Rounds & James S. Goodwin, States 
with the Least Restrictive Regulations Experienced the Largest Increase in Patients Seen by 
Nurse Practitioners, 32 HEALTH AFF. 1236, 1238–41 (2013).  
 77. Jeffrey Traczynski & Victoria Udalova, Nurse Practitioner Independence, Health 
Care Utilization, and Health Outcomes, 58 J. HEALTH ECON. 90, 104 (2018).  
 78. Markowitz et al., supra note 10, at 204–08.  
 79. Id. at 209–16.  
 80. Id. at 209–10.  
 81. See infra Part II.  
 82. Stange, supra note 40, at 1.  
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laws. The evidentiary and legal foundation laid here provides the basis for the 
empirical analysis presented in the next section.  
A. Malpractice Liability and the Provision of Healthcare  
By allowing individuals harmed by another’s negligence—here, malpractice—to 
recover damages, tort law both compensates victims for their injuries and deters 
wrongdoers—negligent providers—from engaging in tortious behavior in the first 
instance. While the compensatory role played by tort law is certainly important,83 its 
ability to deter negligence—the provision of substandard, low-quality, or unsafe 
healthcare—is at least as important and has garnered attention from researchers and 
policymakers alike.84 The current literature on the role of malpractice liability in the 
healthcare system can be broadly categorized into two strands, though there is some 
overlap between the two. In the first, studies focus on the general question of the 
extent to which malpractice liability impacts how providers deliver care, particularly 
whether it deters them from the provision of unsafe or low-quality care. In the 
second, studies focus more narrowly on the question of defensive medicine, which 
is “a deviation from sound medical practice that is induced primarily by a threat of 
liability”—in other words, a problem of overdeterrence.85 
Beginning with the first, and more general, strand of research, the evidence 
demonstrates that malpractice liability exerts meaningful deterrence on providers. 
For example, Bernard Black and colleagues examined “the association between rates 
of adverse patient safety events and rates for paid medical malpractice claims” and 
concluded that “hospitals can meaningfully reduce malpractice claims by investing 
in patient safety.”86 Indeed, their finding that “a one standard deviation reduction in 
[standardized patient safety measures] would decrease paid malpractice claims by 
about 16 percent” demonstrates a clear relationship between malpractice liability and 
patient safety.87 Examining a similar set of patient safety measures, Toshiaki Iizuka 
similarly concluded that “higher liability pressure reduces preventable medical 
complications,” consistent with tort law exerting a deterrent effect on providers.88 
 
 
 83. Frakes & Jena, supra note 18, at 142 (“The imposition of liability under tort law is 
sometimes said to serve a purely private function—to correct the injustice created by a 
wrongdoer and/or to provide compensation to those harmed by that wrongdoer.”).  
 84. See Black et al., supra note 17, at 109 (“A central goal of tort liability is to deter risky 
or negligent behavior by imposing liability on the ‘acting’ party for harm to an injured party.”); 
Yang et al., supra note 22, at 217–18 (“In the context of medical malpractice, conventional 
tort theory suggests that health-care providers who face the threat or imposition of economic 
and noneconomic penalties for rendering negligent care will take socially optimal levels of 
precautions, thus improving the quality of care and health outcomes.”). See generally MELLO 
& KACHALIA, supra note 18, at 9–12 (reviewing the studies focusing on tort law’s ability to 
deter providers and reforms aimed at modifying this deterrence role).  
 85. David M. Studdert, Michelle M. Mello, William M. Sage, Catherine M. DesRoches, 
Jordon Peugh, Kinga Zapert & Troyen A Brennan, Defensive Medicine Among High-Risk 
Specialist Physicians in a Volatile Malpractice Environment, 293 JAMA 2609, 2609 (2005). 
 86. Black et al., supra note 17, at 110.  
 87. Id. at 111. 
 88. Iizuka, supra note 17, at 164. 
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Because of the sensitivity of obstetric care to malpractice pressure,89 multiple 
studies have investigated the role of liability risk in the provision of obstetric care. 
Measuring malpractice pressure directly with the malpractice insurance premiums 
paid by physicians and examining the effect of malpractice liability on labor and 
delivery outcomes, Tony Yang and colleagues concluded that “higher malpractice 
premiums for obstetrician-gynecologists stimulate greater use of cesarean section 
and reduced rates of VBAC [vaginal birth after a C-section],” which is suggestive of 
a deterrence role for tort law.90 Taking a different approach by focusing on the 
specific deterrence malpractice claims can have on individual physicians—instead 
of examining the general deterrence exerted by malpractice pressure—Ity Shurtz 
analyzed the effect of malpractice claims on the provision of obstetric care.91 He 
found that C-section rates increased between 4% and 8% after a physician faced a 
successful malpractice claim (i.e., one that led to a payment).92 Thus, Shurtz 
demonstrated that tort law generally and tort claims specifically can deter physicians 
and impact how they deliver care. Along the same lines, David Dranove and 
Yasutora Watanabe examined the effect of lawsuits filed against individual 
physicians and physicians who practiced in the same hospital.93 They found similar, 
though somewhat smaller, effects as reported by Shurtz.94 
Approaching the issue of deterrence from yet another angle, Michael Frakes and 
Anupam Jena concentrated on healthcare quality, liability pressure, and the question 
of “pressure to do what?”95 Examining changes in the standards of care against which 
physicians’ actions are judged and their effect on obstetric complications (among 
other outcomes), Frakes and Jena concluded that “medical liability forces—under 
the right structural framework—hold the potential to elevate the quality floor.”96 
Noting that some prior work had found mixed results on the deterrent effect exerted 
 
 
 89. Beomsoo Kim, The Impact of Malpractice Risk on the Use of Obstetrics Procedures, 
36 J. LEGAL STUD. S79, S82–85 (2007). See generally Michelle M. Mello & Carly N. Kelly, 
Effects of a Professional Liability Crisis on Residents’ Practice Decisions, 105 OBSTETRICS 
& GYNECOLOGY 1287, at 1290–94 (2005); Michelle M. Mello, David M. Studdert, Catherine 
M. DesRoches, Jordon Peugh, Kinga Zapert, Troyen A. Brennan & William M. Sage, Effects 
of a Malpractice Crisis on Specialist Supply and Patient Access to Care, 242 ANNALS SURG. 
621, at 623–25 (2005); Studdert et al., supra note 85, at 2612–14. 
 90. Y. Tony Yang, Michelle M. Mello, S.V. Subramanian & David M. Studdert, 
Relationship Between Malpractice Litigation Pressure and Rates of Cesarean Section and 
Vaginal Birth After Cesarean Section, 47 MED. CARE 234, 238 (2009).  
 91. Ity Shurtz, The Impact of Medical Errors on Physician Behavior: Evidence from 
Malpractice Litigation, 32 J. HEALTH ECON. 331, 332–35 (2013).  
 92. Id. at 332. Shurtz explains that “fear of lawsuits affects treatment patterns and may 
encourage high-cost, low-benefit medical treatment (‘defensive medicine’).” Id. at 331–32. 
With this possibility in mind, Shurtz’s study “examine[d] the impact of physicians’ medical 
errors on their subsequent behavior . . . .” Id. at 332.  
 93. David Dranove & Yasutora Watanabe, Influence and Deterrence: How Obstetricians 
Respond to Litigation Against Themselves and Their Colleagues, 12 AM. L. ECON. REV. 69, 
69–74 (2010).  
 94. Id. 
 95. Frakes & Jena, supra note 18, at 143.  
 96. Id. at 144.  
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by tort law,97 the authors cautioned against “rul[ing] out medical liability from the 
health care quality discussion based on” these studies.98 In earlier work, Frakes 
examined the effect of changes in the standard of care on physician practice 
patterns.99 He found that the movement from a standard based on local practices to 
one based on national practices led to a decline in regional variation in care.100 Based 
on this evidence, he concluded that “the law holds the potential to deter particular 
clinical practices.”101  
While not all studies that have investigated the effect of malpractice liability on 
healthcare generally or obstetric care specifically have found evidence of a deterrent 
effect,102 the weight of the evidence suggests that malpractice liability impacts the 
delivery of care and deters individual providers.103 Indeed, the propensity of 
physicians to respond to the threat of liability has sparked an intense debate over 
whether malpractice liability overdeters providers, which has, in turn, led to concerns 
about the practice of defensive medicine.104 Generally speaking, “[d]efensive 
medicine is deterrence gone awry,” as providers perform tests and procedures not 
because they are medically indicated but to avoid liability in the future.105 
The existence and pervasiveness of defensive medicine form the basis of the 
second strand of research focusing on malpractice liability and healthcare, and 
Frakes and Jena provide an extensive discussion of why the more narrow and 
nuanced question of defensive medicine should be separated from the more general 
question of deterrence.106 While the extent to which defensive medicine is practiced 
remains a contentious issue, prior studies have revealed some evidence that providers 
practice defensively. For example, Katherine Baicker and several coauthors found 
that a 10% increase in the average payment to a patient who has asserted a 
malpractice claim was associated with up to a 1.8% increase in the use of diagnostic 
 
 
 97. See, e.g., Lisa Dubay, Robert Kaestner & Timothy Waidmann, The Impact of 
Malpractice Fears on Caesarean Section Rates, 18 J. HEALTH ECON. 491, 491 (1999) (finding 
only small effects of malpractice pressure on obstetric outcomes).  
 98. Frakes & Jena, supra note 18, at 158.  
 99. Michael Frakes, The Impact of Medical Liability Standards on Regional Variations 
in Physician Behavior: Evidence from the Adoption of National-Standard Rules, 103 AM. 
ECON. REV. 257, 257–60 (2013). 
 100. Id. at 267–71.  
 101. Id. at 275.  
 102. See, e.g., Gilbert W. Gimm, The Impact of Malpractice Liability Claims on 
Obstetrical Practice Patterns, 45 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 195, 195 (2010) (“I did not find 
evidence that physicians changed their practice patterns by increasing C-section rates in 
response to malpractice claims.”); Kim, supra note 89, at S84 (“My findings demonstrate that 
c-section rates are not responsive to medical malpractice risk.”). 
 103. See generally MELLO & KACHALIA, supra note 18, at 1–2 (providing a thorough 
evaluation of the role of malpractice liability in the healthcare system).  
 104. For a review of the ongoing debate over defensive medicine, see Benjamin J. 
McMichael, The Failure of “Sorry”: An Empirical Evaluation of Apology Laws, Health Care, 
and Medical Malpractice, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1199. 1200–02 (2018).  
 105. Yang et al., supra note 22, at 218.  
 106. Frakes & Jena, supra note 18, at 157.  
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tests,107 and Brandon Roberts and Irving Hoch concluded that Medicare spending 
increases by nearly $2.50 per beneficiary for every additional lawsuit per 100,000 
county residents.108  
With respect to obstetric care, some evidence suggests that providers respond to 
malpractice liability consistent with the practice of defensive medicine. For example, 
following up on their original study which showed changes in C-section and VBAC 
rates in response to malpractice pressure,109 Yang and colleagues found that 
indicators of adverse birth outcomes remained unchanged when malpractice pressure 
increased.110 This suggests that providers practice defensively, as they change how 
they treat patients, with little effect on adverse outcomes.111  
The traditional response to the practice of defensive medicine and to medical 
malpractice liability crises more generally has been the passage of tort reforms, 
which are designed to limit malpractice pressure on providers.112 Despite these 
intentions, the evidence is mixed on whether tort reforms reduce malpractice 
pressure and the practice of defensive medicine (or change the treatment decisions 
of providers more generally).113 In early work, Daniel Kessler and Mark McClellan 
found that tort reforms which directly reduce malpractice pressure, such as caps on 
noneconomic damages, decrease hospital expenditures by 5% to 9% for patients 
suffering from cardiac episodes, with little change in medical complications or 
mortality rates.114 Examining a similar patient population, a more recent study also 
found that noneconomic damages caps reduce the probability that a patient suffering 
from a heart attack receives relatively more intensive and invasive treatment, with 
no attendant increase in mortality rates.115 Reviewing the available evidence, 
 
 
 107. Katherine Baicker, Elliott S. Fisher & Amitabh Chandra, Malpractice Liability Costs 
and the Practice of Medicine in the Medicare Program, 26 HEALTH AFF. 841, 847–48 (2007). 
 108. Brandon Roberts & Irving Hoch, Malpractice Litigation and Medical Costs in 
Mississippi, 16 HEALTH ECON. 841, 846 (2007).  
 109. Yang et al., supra note 90, at 237–40; see also Philip Zwecker, Laurent Azoulay & 
Haim A. Abenhaim, Effect of Fear of Litigation on Obstetric Care: A Nationwide Analysis on 
Obstetric Practice, 28 AM. J. PERINATOLOGY 277, 277 (2011) (finding that higher malpractice 
premiums are associated with higher incidences of C-sections and lower rates of vaginal births 
after C-sections).  
 110. Yang et al., supra note 22, at 237.  
 111. Id. 
 112. Myungho Paik, Bernard Black & David A. Hyman, Damage Caps and Defensive 
Medicine, Revisited, 51 J. HEALTH ECON. 84, 84–87 (2017); see also Paul C. Weiler, 
Reforming Medical Malpractice in a Radically Moderate—and Ethical—Fashion, 54 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 205, 216–19 (2005).  
 113. See generally MELLO & KACHALIA, supra note 18, at 101–03 (reviewing the available 
evidence on tort reforms and concluding that some are effective and some are not); Michelle 
M. Mello, Allen Kachalia & David M. Studdert, Medical Liability—Prospects for Federal 
Reform, 376 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1806, 1806–08 (2017) (reviewing the same).  
 114. Daniel Kessler & Mark McClellan, Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine?, 111 
Q.J. ECON. 353, 386 (1996).  
 115. Avraham & Schanzenbach, supra note 16, at 276–78, 284. 
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Michelle Mello and Allen Kachalia concluded that tort reforms can reduce some, 
though not all, indications of defensive medicine.116  
Focusing on the role of tort reform in the provision of obstetric care, Janet Currie 
and Bentley MacLeod considered the possibility that fear of malpractice liability 
causes obstetricians to perform C-sections at an inappropriately high rate.117 
Examining a variety of reforms, they found that noneconomic damages caps increase 
the use of C-sections, while joint and several liability reform (which alters how 
liability is allocated between the obstetrician and other actors that may contribute to 
a medical error) reduces the use of this procedure.118 These results are somewhat 
counterintuitive based on conventional wisdom that higher malpractice pressure 
induces the provision of more intensive treatments, and they contradict the results 
from previous studies. However, Currie and MacLeod explain that if the rate of C-
sections is excessive—which existing evidence suggests it is119—not because of 
liability but because this procedure is more profitable, then noneconomic damages 
caps (which reduce liability) should increase C-section use and joint and several 
liability reform (which increases the accountability of providers for their own 
actions) should decrease C-section use.120 They find similar evidence that 
noneconomic damages caps and joint and several liability reform increase and 
decrease, respectively, inductions of labor and complications of labor and 
delivery.121  
Extending the work of Currie and MacLeod, Frakes analyzed the role of tort 
reform in the provision of obstetric care, focusing on C-sections, episiotomies, and 
delivery bed days (all of which are measures of treatment intensity).122 Importantly, 
he examined obstetric data over a longer time period than Currie and MacLeod, 
which allowed him to examine a richer set of legal changes and augment the 
empirical analysis.123 He found that noneconomic damages caps reduce the use of 
 
 
 116. MELLO & KACHALIA, supra note 18, at 101–03; see also Anca M. Cotet, The Impact 
of Noneconomic Damages Cap on Health Care Delivery in Hospitals, 14 AM. L. & ECON. 
REV. 192, 216–17 (2012) (finding that tort reforms can reduce the overall number of surgeries 
and hospital admissions). But see Frank A. Sloan & John H. Shadle, Is There Empirical 
Evidence for “Defensive Medicine”? A Reassessment, 28 J. HEALTH ECON. 481, 481 (2009) 
(finding no effect of tort reforms on Medicare spending).  
 117. Currie & MacLeod, supra note 16, at 820, 825–26. 
 118. Id. at 819–26.  
 119. Ana P. Betrán, Mario Merialdi, Jeremy A. Lauer, Wang Bing-Shun, Jane Thomas, 
Paul Van Look & Marsden Wagner, Rates of Caesarean Section: Analysis of Global, Regional 
and National Estimates, 21 PAEDIATRIC PERINATAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 98, 101–05 (2007).  
 120. Currie & MacLeod, supra note 16, at 804–13. This description is consistent with the 
practice of “offensive medicine,” which involves an increase in the use of relatively more 
profitable procedures when the liability risk associated with those procedures declines. Other 
research has found evidence of the practice of offensive medicine in obstetrics and cardiology. 
See Avraham & Schanzenbach, supra note 16, at 275 (finding evidence of offensive medicine 
in the treatment of heart attack patients); Shurtz, supra note 91, at 338–39 (finding evidence 
consistent with offensive medicine in the performance of C-sections).  
 121. Currie & MacLeod, supra note 16, at 819–26.  
 122. Michael Frakes, Defensive Medicine and Obstetric Practices, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 457, 459, 462–64 (2012).  
 123. Id. at 467–71.  
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episiotomies and the number of delivery bed days and have no statistically significant 
effect on C-sections.124  
While the effect of malpractice liability on the provision of healthcare has 
garnered substantial attention over the past thirty years, this attention has been 
overwhelmingly focused on physician-delivered care. Indeed, the few studies to even 
consider APRNs and PAs in a malpractice context have focused on either the 
propensity of these providers to generate malpractice claims125 or the effect of 
malpractice pressure on their location decisions.126 While the evidence demonstrates 
that APRNs and PAs generate malpractice claims and respond, at least in where they 
choose to practice, to malpractice liability, no prior work has investigated how 
malpractice liability interacts with SOP laws to affect the provision of healthcare. 
The empirical analysis below fills the gap in the existing evidence, but before delving 
into that analysis, the next Section details the legal connections between malpractice 
liability and SOP laws for physicians, APRNs, and PAs.  
B. Legal Connections Between Providers and Implications for Liability  
In general, patients may hold APRNs and PAs liable for malpractice just as they 
may hold physicians and other professionals liable.127 However, while physicians are 
generally responsible for their own malpractice, the same is not necessarily true for 
APRNs and PAs, as patients may use various theories of liability to hold a physician 
supervising an APRN or PA liable for an injury involving the APRN or PA.128 
Indeed, the number of malpractice claims against APRNs and PAs may be artificially 
low because claimants may choose to assert claims against their supervising 
physicians under various theories of vicarious and direct liability.129  
Four general doctrines are particularly relevant.130 While these doctrines may bear 
slightly different names in different states and may be treated slightly differently by 
those states, the doctrines discussed here—primarily in the language of the 
restatements for ease of exposition—form the core of the legal bases for holding 
physicians liable based on the actions of APRNs and PAs.131 First, under the theory 
 
 
 124. Id. at 471–79. 
 125. See Douglas M. Brock, Jeffrey G. Nicholson & Roderick S. Hooker, Physician 
Assistant and Nurse Practitioner Malpractice Trends, 74 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 613, 615–
622 (2017) (examining the number of malpractice claims paid by or on behalf of PAs, NPs, 
and physicians).  
 126. McMichael, supra note 4, at 749–59.  
 127. See Brock et al., supra note 125, at 615–622 (detailing the number of claims paid by 
or on behalf of NPs and PAs).  
 128. McMichael et al., supra note 15, at 314–17.  
 129. Id. at 321–24. 
 130. See id. at 314–17; see also Thomas R. McLean, Crossing the Quality Chasm: 
Autonomous Physician Extenders Will Necessitate a Shift to Enterprise Liability Coverage for 
Health Care Delivery, 12 HEALTH MATRIX 239, 264 (2002) (“[T]he medical director of a 
physician extender accrues liability either directly for negligent selection and retention of an 
incompetent physician extender, or vicariously under the doctrines of respondeat superior or 
the principle of ostensible agency.”); id. at 264–70 (discussing the relevant doctrines).  
 131. States may maintain doctrines that are related to, but not exactly the same as, the 
doctrines discussed here. One example is the “captain of the ship” doctrine which allows 
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of respondeat superior, a supervising physician may be held liable for the malpractice 
of an APRN or PA under her supervision because “[a]n employer [the physician] is 
subject to liability for torts committed by employees [the APRN or PA] while acting 
within the scope of their employment.”132 Here, an employee “is an agent whose 
principal controls or has the right to control the manner and means of the agent’s 
performance of work.”133 And “[a]n employee acts within the scope of employment 
when performing work assigned by the employer or engaging in a course of conduct 
subject to the employer’s control.”134 Thus, an APRN or PA providing healthcare 
under the supervision of a physician is essentially the archetypal example of a 
situation in which the principal (the physician) may be held liable for the tort 
(malpractice) of the agent (the APRN or PA).  
Second, under a theory of apparent agency, a patient may hold a supervising 
physician liable for the malpractice of an APRN or PA under her supervision if the 
physician’s “manifestations” caused the patient to reasonably believe that the APRN 
or PA was acting on the physician’s behalf.135 In other words, if the patient believes 
(as a result of some action taken or not taken by the physician) that the APRN or PA 
was acting on the physician’s behalf, the patient may extend liability for the acts of 
the APRN or PA to the physician.  
Third and fourth, the related doctrines of negligent hiring and negligent 
supervision may allow patients to hold physicians directly, as opposed to vicariously, 
liable. Under these doctrines, it is not the malpractice of the APRN or PA that results 
in the physician’s liability but the physician’s direct failure in hiring or supervising 
the APRN or PA.136 For example, if a physician is responsible for supervising an 
APRN, and the latter causes harm to a patient because she lacked the appropriate 
training to provide a healthcare service safely, the physician may be held liable for 
negligent supervision.  
In general, restrictive SOP laws that require physician supervision of APRNs and 
PAs may facilitate the use of these (and related) theories in holding physicians liable 
for medical errors involving APRNs and PAs in two distinct ways. First, restrictive 
SOP laws may directly aid patients in holding physicians liable for errors involving 
APRNs and PAs. For example, if a patient was harmed by an APRN in a state that 
patients to hold a physician liable for malpractice when other providers were involved in the 
injury based on the physician’s status as the “captain of the ship” (i.e., the provider in overall 
control of the situation). See, e.g., Ochoa v. Vered, 212 P.3d 963, 966–67 (Colo. App. 2009) 
(discussing the captain of the ship doctrine). The purpose of the discussion here is to provide 
the general legal basis for holding a physician liable based on the contents of a state’s SOP 
laws. An exhaustive review of all of the variations of the doctrines that may allow a patient to 
hold a physician liable based on the involvement of an APRN or PA is well beyond the scope 
of this discussion.  
132. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
133. Id. § 7.07(3)(a).
134. Id. § 7.07(2).
135. Id. § 7.08; see also id. § 2.03.
136. While “supervision” accounts for most of what may create liability, a physician may
be liable for the harm caused by an APRN or PA if it was caused by the physician’s 
“negligence in selecting, training, retaining, supervising, or otherwise controlling the” APRN 
or PA. Id. § 7.05(1). 
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requires physician supervision of APRNs, that patient will find it relatively easy to 
show that the physician “controlled” or had the “right to control” the APRN in 
providing healthcare—a necessary element under respondeat superior—since a state 
statute explicitly provides that right to control and may even require that the 
physician and APRN reduce that right to control to writing in the form of a 
supervision agreement. Similarly, patients may find it easier to show that a physician 
was negligent in supervising a PA when state law requires that the physician be 
onsite when the PA is providing care.  
Next, restrictive SOP laws may indirectly aid patients in holding physicians 
liable. For example, even if a patient chooses not to (or is unable to for some reason) 
rely on a statute requiring physician supervision of APRNs to establish the elements 
under respondeat superior, the fact that such a statute exists necessarily means that 
APRNs will be more likely to enter into practice arrangements that satisfy the 
requirements of this doctrine. Similarly, restrictive SOP laws can force APRNs and 
PAs into practice arrangements that necessarily involve a physician hiring and 
supervising them, thereby facilitating claims of negligent hiring and supervision.  
Prior empirical research has found evidence that SOP laws directly impact the 
malpractice claims filed against physicians.137 Examining a national dataset of 
malpractice claims filed against physicians, Benjamin McMichael, Barbara Safriet, 
and Peter Buerhaus found that the number of claims asserted against physicians 
decline as NPs gain more autonomy.138 This is consistent with patients holding 
physicians liable (vicariously or directly) for harms involving NPs under their 
supervision and suggests that relaxing supervision requirements for APRNs erodes 
the ability of injured patients to hold physicians liable.  
To be clear, while the evidence demonstrates that restrictive SOP laws facilitate 
the ability of patients to hold physicians liable, laws requiring physician supervision 
are neither necessary, nor sufficient, to establish any of the theories of liability 
discussed here. Whether a physician can be held liable ultimately depends on the 
facts of a case, and while restrictive SOP laws can facilitate—directly or indirectly 
as discussed above—physician liability, the facts of a particular case may not lend 
themselves to physician liability even though a restrictive SOP law is in place.139 
Conversely, the facts may lend themselves to physician liability even in the absence 
of a restrictive SOP law. Additionally, states may differ in their willingness to apply 
certain doctrines to the physician-APRN and physician-PA relationships, though the 
courts that have reached this question have generally held that APRNs and PAs 
function as the agents of their supervising physicians, thus allowing injured patients 
to pursue vicarious liability claims against those physicians.140 
 
 
 137. McMichael et al., supra note 15, at 323–24.  
 138. Id. 
 139. See, e.g., Petzel v. Valley Orthopedics Ltd., 770 N.W.2d 787, 792–94 (Wis. Ct. App. 
2009) (holding that summary judgment on physician’s liability was inappropriate based on 
factual questions surrounding a PA’s involvement).  
 140. See, e.g., Ruggiero v. Miles, 125 A.D.3d 1216, 1216–17 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) 
(holding physician vicariously liable for the negligence of an APRN); Cox v. M.A. Primary 
and Urgent Care Clinic, 313 S.W.3d 240, 253–54 (Tenn. 2010) (noting that “a physician 
assistant stands in an agency relationship with his or her supervising physician” and holding 
that, therefore, the physician “could be found vicariously liable for [the PA’s] negligence”). 
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Though restrictive SOP laws do not guarantee that a patient may hold a physician 
(directly or vicariously) liable when an APRN or PA was involved in causing harm 
to that patient, such laws certainly facilitate this liability.141 State laws that mandate 
more physician involvement in the practices of APRNs and PAs necessarily ease 
plaintiffs’ burdens under all the theories outlined above, as pointing to a state statute 
mandating some level of supervision generally makes the supervision element of a 
vicarious liability claim (or negligent supervision/hiring claim) easier to prove.142  
By easing the burden of holding physicians liable, restrictive SOP laws effectively 
shift liability away from APRNs and PAs to physicians.143 This shifting of liability 
has the effect of raising the expected costs of liability for physicians and 
commensurately lowering these costs for APRNs and PAs.144 Thus, all else equal, 
 
 
But see TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 157.060 (West Supp. 2018) (“Unless the physician has reason 
to believe the physician assistant or advanced practice registered nurse lacked the competency 
to perform the act, a physician is not liable for an act of a physician assistant or advanced 
practice registered nurse solely because the physician signed a standing medical order, a 
standing delegation order, or another order or protocol, or entered into a prescriptive authority 
agreement . . . .”).  
 141. CAROLYN BUPPERT, NURSE PRACTITIONER’S BUSINESS PRACTICE AND LEGAL GUIDE 
268 (4th ed. 2012) (“[I]f a physician is required, by policy or law, to supervise, then a 
physician has the responsibility of supervisors in general.”). 
 142. Id. at 267 (“[P]hysicians cannot expect to be fully free from threat of lawsuit for the 
acts of the [APRNs] they collaborate with or supervise until the legal requirements for 
collaboration are lifted.”). 
 143. Two additional details are worth noting. First, with respect to APRNs, some states 
require that APRNs “collaborate” with physicians (instead of that they be “supervised” by 
physicians). Compare N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6902 (McKinney 2016) (referring to a 
“collaborating physician”), with TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-7-126 (2017) (referring to physician 
“supervision”). In addition to making little difference in terms of actual physician involvement 
in an APRN’s practice, the terms “collaborate” and “supervise” are functionally equivalent 
for the purposes of liability. See, e.g., Ruggiero, 125 A.D.3d at 1216–17 (holding that a 
physician, despite the use of “collaborate” instead of “supervise” in the state statute, had the 
right to control the actions of the APRN and that, accordingly, he could be held vicariously 
liable for the APRN’s malpractice). Second, with respect to PAs, all states require that 
physicians supervise PAs. McMichael, supra note 4, at 735–36. While these requirements will 
generally ease patients’ burdens in holding physicians liable, more restrictive supervision 
requirements will nonetheless further ease those burdens. In general, however, the marginal 
difference between different classes of physician supervision laws for PAs in terms of the ease 
with which a physician can be held liable will be smaller than the marginal difference between 
classes for APRNs. 
 144. The liability shifting discussed here may be undermined by the availability of other 
legal doctrines. Depending on the facts of the case and the specific legal theory or theories 
employed, the physician may be able to pursue the APRN or PA involved in the injury for 
indemnification or contribution—subrogation rights may also become relevant. While the 
possibility that these (or other) doctrines may impact the ways in which liability costs are 
shifted among different types of providers is worth noting, there are good reasons to believe 
that the availability of these legal avenues will not dramatically impact the liability shifting 
discussed here. First, the majority of malpractice claims are resolved via settlement, which 
may undermine the ability of physicians to pursue indemnification or contribution claims 
against APRNs and PAs. See Benjamin J. McMichael, R. Lawrence Van Horn & W. Kip 
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physicians face higher malpractice pressure when state law requires them to 
supervise or collaborate with APRNs and PAs, while APRNs and PAs face lower 
malpractice pressure. This connection between malpractice liability and SOP laws 
and its ability to shift liability among providers has the potential to substantially 
impact how providers deliver healthcare, particularly since both legal regimes have 
been shown to independently impact healthcare delivery.145 The next Part explores 
this connection and its potential impact in more detail.  
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS  
To test whether the legal connections between SOP laws and malpractice liability 
have a direct impact on the provision of healthcare, I conduct the first empirical 
analysis of the joint effect of these legal regimes. Examining the role of these regimes 
in healthcare necessarily involves analyzing clinical outcomes, and I focus on 
obstetric care throughout the analysis, specifically, the method of delivery employed 
at birth. This healthcare outcome has been analyzed by prior work,146 meaning there 
exists a useful point of comparison for the results reported here.  
Before delving into the details of the empirical analysis, it is important to note 
that the question of whether physicians, APRNs, and PAs practice defensive 
medicine is beyond the scope of this Article. While interesting, analyzing this 
question is of secondary concern to the broader questions of whether and to what 
extent tort law deters providers and whether it interacts with SOP laws. Additionally, 
as Frakes and Jena note,147 examining whether providers practice defensively 
involves nuanced considerations that are difficult to appreciate without an 
understanding of how tort law exerts influence on those providers generally. This 
Article focuses on the broader question of tort law’s effect on providers and leaves 
the more specific question of defensive medicine to future work.  
This Part begins with an overview of the medical context in which the analysis 
occurs and the dataset I examine. It then engages with the existing literature and the 
legal regimes mentioned above to form hypotheses about how changes to those 
regimes may impact the provision of healthcare. Most importantly, it describes the 
 
 
Viscusi, “Sorry” Is Never Enough: How State Apology Laws Fail to Reduce Medical 
Malpractice Liability Risk, 71 STAN. L. REV. 341, 367 (2019) (providing evidence that most 
malpractice claims are resolved without verdicts). Second, indemnity claims are rarely 
pursued even when available. Gary T. Schwartz, The Hidden and Fundamental Issue of 
Employer Vicarious Liability, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1739, 1753, 1764–67 (1996) (discussing the 
rarity of indemnification claims). Third, prior work has noted that subrogation rights, even 
when they are legally available, may be difficult to assert and may, therefore, be rarely used. 
See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Subrogation and the Theory of Insurance When 
Suits Can Be Brought for Losses Suffered, 34 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 619, 636–38 (2018) 
(discussing the legal restrictions on subrogation and general ignorance of the availability of 
subrogation); see also Kenneth S. Reinker & David Rosenberg, Unlimited Subrogation: 
Improving Medical Malpractice Liability by Allowing Insurers to Take Charge, 36 J. LEGAL 
STUD. S261, S261–67 (2007) (offering a proposal to address important limitations of 
subrogation).  
 145. See Markowitz et al., supra note 10, at 216; Yang et al., supra note 22, at 240–41. 
 146. E.g., Currie & MacLeod, supra note 16, at 819–26. 
 147. Frakes & Jena, supra note 18, at 157–58.  
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empirical analysis and discusses the results of that analysis. The Technical Appendix 
discusses the econometric details of the analysis as well as supplementary analyses 
and results.148 
A. Data and Medical Context 
While SOP laws and malpractice liability can impact a wide range of healthcare 
services, it is not feasible to examine the entire healthcare system at once. 
Accordingly, I limit my analysis to a single context—obstetric care. Obstetric care 
is a critically important area of healthcare and one which suffers from problems that 
have substantial implications for patients. For example, among developed countries, 
the United States has the highest maternal mortality rate, and, as maternal mortality 
rates continue to decline across much of the world, they have increased in the United 
States.149 In fact, childbirth is more likely to kill the mother today than a quarter 
century ago.150 While many reasons may help to explain this problematic trend, the 
provision of unnecessarily intensive treatments may factor into high maternal 
mortality rates.151 Indeed, in the United States, 32% of infants are delivered via C-
section.152 The World Health Organization (WHO), following a systematic review 
of the available evidence, “concluded that at population level, [C-section] rates 
higher than 10% were not associated with reductions in maternal and newborn 
mortality rates.”153 While C-sections can improve outcomes and save lives, at current 
rates, they can pose significant risks to mothers and infants and are often performed 
for nonmedical reasons.154 
Beyond the importance of obstetric care in and of itself, it is uniquely well suited 
to an empirical analysis of the joint effect of SOP laws and malpractice liability for 
several reasons. First, obstetric care can be provided by physicians, APRNs 
(particularly CNMs), and PAs, meaning that changes to the SOP laws governing 
 
 
 148. Technical Appendix, supra note 31. 
 149. See Nicholas J. Kassebaum, Caitlyn Steiner, Christopher J. L. Murray, Alan D. Lopez 
& Rafael Lozano, GBD 2015 MATERNAL MORTALITY COLLABORATORS, Global, Regional, 
and National Levels of Maternal Mortality, 1990–2015: A Systematic Analysis for the Global 
Burden of Disease Study 2015, 388 LANCET 1775, 1775–77 (2016) (reviewing maternal 
mortality across the world and placing U.S. rates in context); see also Marian F. MacDorman, 
Eugene Declercq, Howard Cabral & Christine Morton, Is the United States Maternal Mortality 
Rate Increasing? Disentangling Trends from Measurement Issues, 128 OBSTETRICS & 
GYNECOLOGY 447, 447 (2016) (“[T]he estimated maternal mortality rate for 48 states and 
Washington, DC, increased from 2000 to 2014; the international trend was in the opposite 
direction.”).  
 150. Ritsema & Klingler, supra note 48, at 11. 
 151. Elizabeth Heubeck, Midwives Could Be Key to Reversing Maternal Mortality Trends, 
CONN. HEALTH I-TEAM (Oct. 30, 2018), http://c-hit.org/2018/10/30/midwives-could-be-key-
to-reversing-maternal-mortality-trends/ [https://perma.cc/4YB4-VBCA].  
 152. See Technical Appendix, supra note 31, at A18. 
 153. Betrán et al., supra note 25, at 667.  
 154. Ties Boerma et al., Global Epidemiology of Use of and Disparities in  
Caesarean Sections, 392 LANCET 1341, 1341 (2018) (“[T]he large increase in [C-section] use, 
often for non-medical indications, is of concern given the risks for both women and 
children.”). 
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these providers will impact the delivery of obstetric care.155 Second, providers are 
sensitive to malpractice pressure when providing obstetric care, meaning that 
changes in malpractice pressure should impact how these providers practice.156 
Because both legal regimes can impact the provision of obstetric care, it is a useful 
context in which to begin searching for a joint effect of these two regimes.  
Third, the treatment choices for laboring mothers allow for some discretion on 
the part of the provider (in consultation with the patient). The presence of “gray 
areas” in which providers could legitimately choose either the more intensive or less 
intensive treatment option means that it is possible to observe some marginal changes 
in treatment choices in response to changes in SOP laws and malpractice pressure. 
Fourth, as described in detail below, it is possible to obtain information on nearly 
every birth in the United States. Including every instance of a particular type of care 
in an empirical analysis eliminates concerns about the possibility of biased samples 
and other potential problems that can occur when only a subset of information is 
included in the analysis. 
The focus of my analysis is the choice of delivery procedure.157 I also consider 
the role of access to care by examining the rate at which CNMs attend births.158 To 
obtain information on obstetric care, I rely on the National Vital Statistics System 
(NVSS). Each infant born alive in the United States is issued a certificate of live birth 
by the state in which the birth occurred.159 Each state then cooperates with the NVSS, 
which is maintained by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and 
the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS), to compile a complete dataset of 
all births within the United States each year.160 I analyze the restricted version of this 
dataset pursuant to a data use agreement with the NCHS. This is the same dataset 
used by Currie and MacLeod, the Yang group, and the Markowitz group, so the 
results presented here are comparable to their results. However, while they each 
limited their analyses to a sample of the dataset—10%, 5%, and 25%, respectively—
I analyze the entire dataset, which contains all births between 1998 and 2015—over 
69 million in total.161  
In the NVSS dataset, I observe a variety of information about each birth, including 
whether a physician or CNM attended the birth.162 Among the information 
 
 
 155. See Markowitz et al., supra note 10, at 209–16 (finding statistically significant effects 
of SOP laws on the provision of obstetric care). 
 156. See Yang et al., supra note 22, at 234 (finding statistically significant effects of 
malpractice pressure on the provision of obstetric care).  
 157. While maternal mortality is obviously important as well, the dataset I examine does 
not include information on mortality. Future work should investigate the effect of SOP laws 
and malpractice pressure on mortality in more depth.  
 158. Heubeck, supra note 151 (explaining the importance of access to CNMs).  
 159. National Vital Statistics System: Birth Data, CDC: NAT’L CTR FOR HEALTH STAT. 
(Nov. 27, 2019), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/births.htm [https://perma.cc/6NZS-6676].  
 160. Id. 
 161. Currie & MacLeod, supra note 16, at 815; Markowitz et al., supra note 10, at 207; 
Yang et al., supra note 22, at 224. 
 162. As noted by the Markowitz group, the provider listed as the attendant at birth on the 
birth certificate is not always a perfect representation of which provider actually cared for the 
mother during labor. Markowitz et al., supra note 10, at 206, 208. Data drawn from birth 
certificates generally undercounts the number of births attended by CNMs. Id. While these 
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concerning delivery method contained in the dataset, I focus on indicators for 
whether the infant was delivered vaginally, whether the infant was delivered via C-
section, whether the infant was delivered vaginally after the mother had previously 
received a C-section, and whether labor was medically induced. Vaginal births 
represent the lowest level of treatment intensity, as they can involve little to no 
medical intervention. C-section births represent the highest level of intensity since 
they involve “a surgical procedure used to deliver a baby through incisions in the 
abdomen and uterus.”163 Medical induction of labor represents an intermediate level 
of intensity between the two, as it involves a specific medical intervention but not a 
surgical procedure.164 C-sections can follow attempted vaginal deliveries and 
medical inductions of labor, and when this occurs, I define that birth as occurring via 
C-section. I also separately consider vaginal births after previous C-sections 
(VBACs) because having a prior C-section reduces the provider’s discretion in 
performing a vaginal delivery in subsequent births. Thus, SOP laws and malpractice 
pressure may affect VBAC rates differently from other birth outcomes.  
In addition to these general outcomes, I collect information to determine whether 
a birth was “high risk,” consistent with the approach of Currie and MacLeod.165 
High-risk births are those in which the mother suffers from a condition which would 
limit providers’ discretion regarding the most appropriate method of delivery.166 I 
also collect information that allows me to identify, consistent with the Markowitz 
study, whether a C-section or induction was apparently “elective.”167 A procedure is 
elective if, based on the information provided on the birth certificate, there are no 
clinical characteristics that favor greater medical intervention.168 While the primary 
focus of the analysis is on C-sections generally, considering delivery methods in 
different contexts (e.g., high-risk and low-risk) is important because providers have 
differing degrees of discretion to choose different delivery procedures in these 
contexts.  
 
 
issues do not make the information on attendants useless, the results from the analysis of 
whether a CNM attended a birth should be interpreted with these limitations in mind. 
 163. C-section, MAYO CLINIC, https://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/c-section/abo 
ut/pac-20393655 [https://perma.cc/67VP-WU69].  
 164. Labor Induction, MAYO CLINIC, https://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/labor-
induction/about/pac-20385141 [https://perma.cc/6EZT-QX64].  
 165. Currie & MacLeod, supra note 16, at 814. 
 166. If the mother suffers from any of the following conditions, Currie and MacLeod 
define the birth as high-risk: “anemia, cardiac or lung conditions, diabetes, herpes, eclampsia, 
incompetent cervix, previous large or preterm deliveries, renal failure, rh problems, or uterine 
bleeding or other medical risk factors.” Id. I identify all of these conditions using the NVSS 
data and create an indicator variable for high-risk pregnancy based on the presence of one or 
more of these factors. While the information available on birth certificates changed in 2003, 
it is still possible to identify high-risk births across the entire dataset.  
 167. Markowitz et al., supra note 10, at 206. 
 168. A labor induction is elective if any of the following characteristics are present: “1) 
premature rupture of membranes and 2) chorioamnionitis (inflammation of the fetal 
membranes due to bacterial infection) or evidence of chorioamnionitis as indicated by the 
presence of intrapartum fever.” A C-section is elective if 1 and 2 are present and there is “3) 
presentation other than cephalic (any part of the fetus other than the head appearing first) and 
4) fetal distress or fetal intolerance of labor.” Id. 
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Next, I collect information on a series of pregnancy and infant health outcomes, 
including the length of gestation, birth weight, the five-minute Apgar score,169 and 
whether the infant suffered a birth injury. All of these outcomes are indicative of 
infant or maternal health.170 While these outcomes are certainly important, I examine 
them primarily as a means to test whether any observed changes in how providers 
deliver care translate into positive or negative outcomes for patients. Accordingly, 
much of this analysis is provided in the Technical Appendix.171 
Finally, I collect demographic and medical information about the mother and 
infant from the data provided in each birth certificate. Specifically, I gather 
information on the mother’s age, education level, race, and marital status at the time 
of birth. I also obtain information on the sex of the infant and the number of infants 
born during a single birth episode. I use this demographic and medical information 
to construct control variables in my analysis since all of these factors can influence 
the method of delivery. 
In addition to all of the other information provided in the NVSS dataset, each 
observation includes the state where the delivery occurred—this information is only 
available in the restricted-use files which require NCHS permission to access. Based 
on this state information, I assign an SOP law to each birth. As described above, I 
assign each state in each year to either the “APRN Independence” or “Restricted 
Practice” category, depending on the APRN SOP laws in place in a particular year, 
and to either the “PA Autonomy” or “Limited Practice” category, depending on the 
PA SOP laws in place.  
Measuring the malpractice pressure faced by individual providers is somewhat 
more difficult than measuring SOP laws. One way that prior work has examined the 
role of malpractice pressure is to consider the effect of tort reforms on various 
outcomes.172 However, while tort reforms may represent clear shifts in the liability 
risk faced by providers, they may not fully capture all of the factors that influence 
the malpractice risks providers must confront. Therefore, I follow the lead of the 
Yang group and measure malpractice liability risk using the malpractice premiums 
paid by physicians since these premiums reflect the various influences on 
malpractice risk.173 Information on premiums comes from a series of surveys of 
 
 
 169. Apgar Score, MEDLINE PLUS (Jan. 6, 2020), https://medlineplus.gov/ency/article/003 
402.htm [https://perma.cc/D4YF-HBTN] (“Apgar is a quick test performed on a baby at 1 and 
5 minutes after birth. The 1-minute score determines how well the baby tolerated the birthing 
process. The 5-minute score tells the health care provider how well the baby is doing outside 
the mother's womb.”). 
 170. See generally Am. C. Obstetrics & Gynecology, Committee Opinion No 579: 
Definition of Term Pregnancy, 122 OBSTETRICS GYNECOLOGY 1139, 1139–40 (2013); Douglas 
Almond, Kenneth Y. Chay & David S. Lee, The Costs of Low Birth Weight, 120 Q.J. ECON. 
1031, 1031–36 (2005).  
 171. Technical Appendix, supra note 31.   
 172. See, e.g., Avraham & Schanzenbach, supra note 16, at 273 (examining the role of tort 
reform in the provision of cardiac care).  
 173. Yang et al., supra note 22, at 222, 226–27.  
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malpractice insurers conducted by the Medical Liability Monitor (MLM), a trade 
publication among malpractice insurers.174 
In the early 1990s, the MLM began surveying malpractice insurers about the rates 
they charged physicians in different parts of the country.175 The information obtained 
through these surveys represents the only source of national, longitudinal data on 
malpractice insurance premiums.176 In each year, the MLM surveyed malpractice 
insurers in each state and obtained information on the premiums charged to 
physicians in three specialties: general surgery, internal medicine, and 
obstetrics/gynecology.177 Beginning with the raw survey responses, several 
researchers led by Bernard Black cleaned the data to produce uniform information 
on the malpractice premiums charged to the three specialties from the early 1990s 
through 2016.178 As a measure of malpractice pressure, I rely on the (weighted) 
average premium charged at the state level as calculated by the Black group. 
Throughout my analysis, I use the state-level information on malpractice premiums 
because the researchers who cleaned the data acknowledge some reporting issues at 
the substate level and because the data use agreement that allows me to analyze the 
NVSS dataset does not permit matching malpractice premium information below the 
state level.179  
At the state level, the Black team provides the average premium charged to 
different specialties for several different types of policies.180  To maintain 
consistency, I concentrate on the premiums charged for a single insurance policy 
type: $1 million/$3 million claims-made policies. This type of policy provides 
coverage for individual incidents up to $1 million, with an overall cap of $3 million 
(over multiple incidents) for the policy period. By limiting my analysis to a single 
type of policy, I standardize the measure of malpractice pressure and avoid the 
problem that a state or year may appear to have higher malpractice pressure simply 
because I measure that pressure with the premium for a different type of policy. 
While $1 million/$3 million claims-made policies are, by far, the most common type 
of policy, the MLM dataset lacks information on this type of policy for several states 
in several years of my study period.181 To address this problem, I use multiple 
imputation methods to impute the premiums charged when they are missing.182 
 
 
 174. See Rate Survey, MED. LIABILITY MONITOR, https://medicalliabilitymonitor.com/rate-
survey/ [https://perma.cc/YCB9-TDLH] (discussing the MLM’s rate survey).  
 175. Bernard Black, Jeanette W. Chung, Jeffrey Traczynski, Victoria Udalova & Sonal 
Vats, Medical Liability Insurance Premia: 1990–2016 Dataset, with Literature Review and 
Summary Information, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 238, 238 (2017).  
 176. Id. at 238.  
 177. Id. at 239. 
 178. Id. at 239–41. 
 179. See id. at 242. 
 180. Bernard Black, Jeanette W. Chung, Jeffrey Traczynski, Victoria Udalova & Sonal 
Vats, Medical Liability Insurance Premia 1990-2015: Dataset, with Literature Review, and 
Summary Information 1–5 (NW. L. & Econ. Research Paper 16-04), https://papers.ssrn.com 
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2477120 [https://perma.cc/8NFT-5KU3]. 
 181. Id. at 5–6. 
 182. Specifically, I impute missing data using a linear regression with the following set of 
demographic variables (defined at the state level): unemployment rate, average income, 
percentage female, percentage white, percentage black, percentage Hispanic, percentage with 
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However, estimating the models reported below with the states missing premium 
data excluded from the analysis leads to little change in the results.  
Throughout the analysis, I use the malpractice premiums paid by general surgeons 
as the measure of malpractice pressure. While the MLM dataset includes premium 
information for obstetricians/gynecologists, using these premiums may induce bias 
in the results. Specifically, SOP laws can affect the ability of patients to hold 
physicians liable, which can affect the number and size of malpractice claims against 
physicians. This can, in turn, impact the malpractice premiums paid by physicians.183 
Moreover, the treatment patterns of obstetric providers themselves may influence 
obstetrician/gynecologist premiums, potentially introducing additional bias.184 To 
address each of these concerns, I follow the approach of Beomsoo Kim who, when 
analyzing the impact of malpractice pressure on obstetricians, measured that pressure 
by focusing on other specialties.185 In particular, the premiums paid by general 
surgeons are not sensitive to state SOP laws because APRNs and PAs cannot practice 
general surgery alone and will, therefore, always be supervised by surgeons when 
practicing in that context. Thus, in the surgery context, changes in SOP laws will not 
meaningfully shift liability among APRNs, PAs, and physicians.186 Additionally, 
changes in obstetric practices will not impact the premiums paid by general surgeons, 
making these premiums the best available measure for the malpractice pressure faced 
by obstetric providers.187 
Using the data on malpractice premiums paid by general surgeons, I classify states 
into quartiles based on the average malpractice premium charged in each year, and I 
use a series of indicator variables for these quartiles throughout my analysis. Thus, 
each state in each year may be categorized into one of four quartiles, with the first 
quartile having the lowest level of malpractice pressure and the fourth quartile having 
 
 
less than a high school education, percentage with a high school education, percentage with 
some college education, and percentage with a college education. I also include a series of 
indicators for the following tort reforms: noneconomic damages caps, punitive damages caps, 
collateral source rule reform, and joint and several liability reform.  
 183. McMichael et al., supra note 15, at 323–24. 
 184. Kim, supra note 89, at S84 (“One challenge for reliable identification is that 
malpractice risk as defined [by a measure of risk specific to obstetrics] may be correlated with 
other factors related to the treatment decision, such as unobserved patient characteristics, 
physician quality, or practice style.”). 
 185. Id. (“In particular, I use the malpractice risk for specialties other than ob-gyn as an 
instrument for the ob-gyn risk measure.”).  
 186. This is not to suggest that APRNs and PAs do not practice alongside general surgeons.  
 187. In the interest of completeness, I have estimated all of the models reported below 
using the premiums paid by obstetrician/gynecologists instead of those paid by general 
surgeons. While these models suffer from the problems outlined above, I nonetheless 
estimated them to ensure that the point estimates do not change wildly. In general, the point 
estimates change somewhat, but the overall results are the same.  
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the highest.188 This approach avoids imposing any assumptions of strict linearity on 
the effect of malpractice pressure.189 
The final dataset I examine includes over 69 million observations of individual 
births between 1998 and 2015.190 Each observation includes the method of delivery, 
medical and demographic information about the mother and infant, and the nature of 
the delivery (e.g., high risk). Based on the state where the birth occurred, each 
observation is linked to an SOP law for APRNs, an SOP law for PAs, and a 
malpractice pressure quartile as defined above. With this information available for 
over 69 million births, the dataset analyzed here represents one of the richest sources 
of information on legal regimes and healthcare outcomes available. It is worth noting 
that the dataset I examine is essentially the same one used by the CDC in calculating 
official U.S. birth statistics.191  
Prior to conducting a formal empirical analysis that can reveal the causal effects 
of different legal regimes, it is useful to examine the general contours of these 
regimes and the healthcare outcomes they may affect. Figure 1 offers a summary of 
C-section rates across the country. Panel A reports the percentage of births involving 
a C-section in each state in 2015, and Panel B reports the percentage change in C-
section rates between 1998 and 2015. In general, C-section rates are higher than 
recommended by the WHO in every state, though states in the South and East have 
the highest rates. Similarly, C-section rates increased in every state between 1998 
and 2015, but there is no obvious regional pattern in this increase.  
 
 
 188. I have also estimated all of the models reported below using deciles (i.e., ten 
individual groupings of states) instead of quartiles with little change in the overall results.  
 189. It also reduces the concern that inaccurately imputed data could be driving the results 
since the imputations would have to be so erroneous as to move a state from one quartile to 
another.  
 190. I limit my analysis to 1998–2015 for two reasons. First, prior work has identified 
some issues with respect to the malpractice premium data used here in the early 1990s. Black 
et al., supra note 175, at 242. Second, prior to 1998, Medicare did not directly reimburse 
APRNs and PAs for their services, instead paying them only for services provided incident to 
physician services—most private insurers maintained similar restrictions. Following the 
passage of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Medicare (and many private insurers) began 
directly reimbursing APRNs and PAs. Michael A. Frakes & Tracylain Evans, An Overview of 
Medicare Reimbursement Regulations for Advanced Practice Nurses, 24 NURSING ECON. 59, 
59–65 (2006). Prior to this Act, APRNs and PAs were effectively tied to physicians under 
federal law, even if state law granted them more autonomy, meaning that the effects of any 
state law changes prior to 1998 would be substantially muted. 
 191. See JOYCE A. MARTIN, BRADY E. HAMILTON & MICHELLE J.K. OSTERMAN, NAT’L CTR. 
FOR HEALTH STAT., BIRTHS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2015, 1–5 (2016) (examining the same data 
as that examined here when deriving official statistics on births in the United States).  
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Figure 1: C-Section Rates by State 
 
Panel A: C-Section Percentages in 2015 
 
Panel B: Percent Change in C-Section Rates Between 1998 and 2015 
 
Figure 2 provides an overview of the medical and legal contexts in which the 
primary analysis occurs. Panel A reports the percentage of births each year that 
occurred in states that allowed APRNs to practice independently and PAs to practice 
autonomously. In general, there has been a marked trend towards relaxing SOP laws 
for both APRNs and PAs. In 1998, only about 3% of births occurred in states where 
APRNs could practice independently, but this number was approaching 20% by 
2015. The trend for PAs is even more striking, with births in states allowing PA 
autonomy increasing from about 5% to almost 50% between 1998 and 2015. While 
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this pattern of SOP law changes is interesting, it also demonstrates that there has 
been substantial variation in SOP laws over time, which is critical for the empirical 
models discussed below. 
Figure 2: Overview of SOP Laws and Obstetric Outcomes 
 
Panel A: Births and SOP Laws                Panel B: APRN SOP Laws and  
      C-Sections 
 
Panel C: PA SOP Laws and C-Sections      Panel D: Malpractice Risk and  
        C-Sections 
While C-section rates in the United States have also followed an upward 
trajectory, these rates are not equal across states with different SOP laws, as 
demonstrated in Panels B and C. States that allow APRNs to practice independently 
and states that allow PAs to practice autonomously always have lower C-section 
rates, though the difference is greater for APRN SOP laws than PA SOP laws. C-
section rates also vary by the amount of malpractice pressure faced by providers, and 
Panel D reports the percentage of births resulting in a C-section across the four 
quartiles of general surgeon malpractice premiums. While the differences in C-
section rates reported in Panels B–D do not establish causal effects of SOP laws or 
malpractice pressure, they do suggest that providers respond to differences in the 
legal environment. Table A2 in the Technical Appendix reports a full set of summary 
statistics for all of the legal and obstetric outcomes of interest across all years of the 
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dataset, and Table A3 reports summary statistics across different SOP law 
regimes.192  
B. Mechanisms of Effect and Expected Impacts of Legal Changes  
In general, malpractice pressure and SOP laws may impact the provision of 
obstetric care through multiple pathways.193 Beginning with malpractice pressure, I 
expect that greater pressure will induce the provision of more intensive care (i.e., 
providers will perform more C-sections, medically induce more patients, and 
perform fewer VBACs). While not every study to investigate malpractice liability 
and obstetric care has found results consistent with these effects,194 the studies most 
similar to the analysis here—those that rely on malpractice premiums as their 
measure of malpractice pressure—have found evidence that an increase in 
malpractice pressure leads to the provision of more intensive care.195 Though 
investigating the practice of defensive medicine is not the focus of my analysis, the 
effects identified in prior work and the effects I expect to find here may be consistent 
with defensive medicine, as providers perform C-sections primarily to avoid liability 
and not for sound medical reasons.196  
Kim offers insight into the relationship between malpractice pressure and C-
sections. She explains that providers generally take a “fetus first” view,197 often 
defaulting to C-sections when they have doubts about the propriety of a vaginal 
delivery.198 This philosophy may stem from the fact that physicians “are more likely 
to be suspected of negligence when the baby is delivered vaginally because of the 
limited control of progress compared with c-section[s.]”199 Kim further notes that 
“[t]he complaint of failure to deliver by c-section is frequently listed as a reason for 
a malpractice claim,”200 which may explain why physicians perform C-sections when 
they “ha[ve] any concerns that a vaginal delivery may threaten the health of [the] 
infant.”201  
Turning to SOP laws, I expect that relaxing the laws governing APRNs and PAs 
will induce the provision of less intensive care (i.e., providers will perform fewer C-
sections, induce labor less often, and perform more VBACs). I also expect that 
CNMs will attend more births. In general, APRNs employ a model of care that relies 
less on medical technology and intensive treatments than physicians.202 Instead of 
relying on these treatments, APRNs tend to spend more time with patients.203 Thus, 
 
 
 192. Technical Appendix, supra note 31. 
 193. For a full discussion of the existing literature, see supra Section II.A. 
 194. See, e.g., Currie & MacLeod, supra note 16, at 816–24 (finding different effects). 
 195. Yang et al., supra note 90, at 237–240; Yang et al., supra note 22, at 236–37. 
 196. Yang et al., supra note 90, at 237–240. 
 197. Kim, supra note 89, at S82–83.  
 198. Ronald M. Cyr, Myth of the Ideal Caesarean Section Rate: Commentary and Historic 
Perspective, 194 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 932, 933 (2006).  
 199. Kim, supra note 89, at S82.  
 200. Id. at S83.  
 201. Id.  
 202. Markowitz et al., supra note 10, at 204.  
 203. Id. 
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to the extent APRNs provide more pre-, peri-, and postnatal care, the use of intensive 
procedures should decline. With respect to PAs, their model of care may hew closer 
to that of physicians than to APRNs—PAs are trained in the “medical model” similar 
to physicians, as opposed to the nursing model of APRNs.204 However, they may still 
rely less on medical technology than physicians.205 Moreover, physicians may rely 
on PAs instead of medical technology and the use of more intensive treatments, 
meaning that as the amount of pre-, peri-, and postnatal care provided by PAs 
increases, the use of intensive treatments should decrease.206 In general, PAs may 
focus on more medically complex patients than APRNs, so the effect of changes in 
PA SOP laws may be more concentrated among these patients than the effects of 
changes in APRN SOP laws.  
Overall, relaxed SOP laws should result in the provision of more care by APRNs 
and PAs and thus a decrease in the rate of intensive treatments (such as C-sections 
and inductions of labor). 207 This reduction may stem from three general mechanisms. 
First, granting APRNs and PAs more authority and autonomy can increase the 
number of these providers, particularly in areas that lack an adequate supply of 
physicians.208 This mechanism may manifest as more CNMs attend births relative to 
their physician colleagues following the liberalization of APRN SOP laws. Second, 
relaxing SOP laws may better enable APRNs and PAs to meet patients’ demand for 
their services, especially in isolated areas or settings where physicians have 
historically not practiced, because they are not as tightly tethered to physicians.209 In 
general, both of these mechanisms directly result in APRNs and PAs providing more 
care and therefore lead to the effects described. Finally, a third mechanism may lead 
to the effects described above via a change in physician practice patterns. Under less 
strict SOP laws, APRNs and PAs can better compete with physicians.210 This 
increased competition may induce physicians to practice more like APRNs and PAs 
to the extent patients demand the latter’s practice styles (i.e., providing less intensive 
treatments). 
In changing the provision of care through these mechanisms, relaxed SOP laws 
likely operate primarily through CNMs, as these providers are heavily involved in 
the provision of obstetric care. However, I include other APRNs (particularly NPs) 
and PAs in the analysis because, while they may be less involved in obstetric care 
 
 
 204. Berkowitz & White, supra note 45, at 41.  
 205. See id. at 40 (explaining that relying on PAs as “laborists” can reduce the need for 
technology-heavy interventions such as C-sections and inductions). 
 206. Id. 
 207. See Markowitz et al., supra note 10, at 204 (offering a similar discussion of these 
effects).  
 208. McMichael, supra note 4, at 759–64.  
 209. GILMAN & KOSLOV, supra note 8, at 30 (“APRNs may find it particularly difficult to 
[secure physician supervision] in rural or other underserved areas where collaborating 
physicians are in short supply.”); see Kleiner et al., supra note 10, at 274–77 (finding that 
APRNs are better able to control their own labor output when they can practice 
independently). GILMAN & KOSLOV, supra note 8, at 30 (“APRNs may find it particularly 
difficult to [secure physician supervision] in rural or other underserved areas where 
collaborating physicians are in short supply.”). 
 210. GILMAN & KOSLOV, supra note 8, at 38–39.  
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than CNMs, relaxed SOP laws directly impact their ability to care for patients in 
contexts that affect obstetric outcomes. For example, if a women’s health NP can 
provide more prenatal care under relaxed SOP laws, this care may obviate the need 
for a C-section later.211 Relatedly, if PAs can better care for laboring mothers under 
relaxed SOP laws, then physicians may be under less pressure to provide C-
sections.212  
Turning next to the joint effect of SOP laws and malpractice pressure, these two 
legal regimes may interact to further affect healthcare beyond the independent effects 
of each regime. As APRNs and PAs gain more authority and autonomy with less 
restrictive SOP laws, they also bear more malpractice pressure because patients’ 
ability to hold physicians vicariously or directly liable for medical errors involving 
APRNs and PAs is diminished.213 And this may lead to differential effects of relaxing 
SOP laws on obstetric care, depending on the malpractice pressure faced by 
providers.  
In particular, individual APRNs and PAs may make different treatment decisions 
when their SOP laws are relaxed depending on whether they face relatively high or 
low malpractice pressure. Because their malpractice risk is lower in states that 
require physician supervision—and physicians’ malpractice risk is commensurately 
higher—APRNs and PAs may not consider the liability implications of their 
individual decisions. However, as they gain more autonomy and therefore see an 
increase in their malpractice risk—physicians see a commensurate decrease in their 
risk—APRNs and PAs may start to more carefully consider the liability implications 
of their decisions. Thus, granting APRNs and PAs more autonomy may have 
different effects on the decisions they make depending on the malpractice pressure 
they face.  
Figure 3, which depicts a hypothetical (and representative) CNM, illustrates the 
differential effect of relaxing SOP laws across different levels of malpractice 
pressure. This CNM initially practices in a state with restrictive SOP laws. Based on 
these laws, her malpractice risk is quite low—patients can relatively easily pursue 
(direct or vicarious) claims against her supervising physician. Now suppose that the 
CNM’s state grants APRNs independence, which both increases the ability of the 
CNM to provide care (including less intensive care) and increases her malpractice 
liability risk because patients can no longer as easily hold her supervising physician 
liable.  
 
 
 211. See Doyle & Silber, supra note 47, at 50–54. 
 212. Berkowitz & White, supra note 45, at 40.  
 213. McMichael et al., supra note 15, at 322–24; see supra Section II.B. 
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Figure 3: Effect of Malpractice Pressure and Scope-of-Practice Laws Generally 
 
 
Suppose further that this state is one with low malpractice pressure generally—
represented by the lower (light gray) path in Figure 3. This low level of malpractice 
pressure may be the result of tort reforms, a legal culture that generally disfavors 
litigation, a healthcare culture that generally encourages dispute resolution outside 
of the legal system, or any of myriad other reasons. If the CNM is granted 
independence in this type of state, the malpractice pressure she faces will increase 
relatively slightly. While patients will find it more difficult to hold her supervising 
physician liable after independence, the marginal increase in malpractice pressure 
the CNM will experience will not be substantial because her state generally has low 
malpractice pressure. Consistent with prior evidence, this newly independent CNM 
will recommend C-sections at lower rates, helping to lower the C-section rate 
overall.214 Because the malpractice pressure is low in this state, the CNM will not 
face substantial pressure to recommend more C-sections in hopes of staving off 
malpractice claims. The net effect, therefore, will be a lower C-section rate.  
On the other hand, suppose that the state where the CNM practices has high 
malpractice pressure—represented by the upper (dark gray) path in Figure 3—which 
may be the case for a variety of reasons. If the CNM is granted independence in this 
type of state, she will see a substantial jump in her malpractice pressure because, 
once their ability to pursue claims against physicians is curtailed, patients will pursue 
claims at relatively high rates against CNMs. Thus, the marginal increase in 
malpractice pressure faced by the CNM following independence will be substantial. 
Accordingly, although this CNM may wish to treat patients less intensively by 
recommending fewer C-sections, the malpractice pressure she faces will dissuade 
her from doing so. The net effect will be, at minimum, a smaller decrease in the C-
 
 
 214. Markowitz et al., supra note 10, at 216–17. 
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section rate than if the state had low malpractice pressure. Potentially, the C-section 
rate may remain unchanged or even increase.  
Magnifying these effects, which pertain to a representative CNM, is the potential 
for changes in SOP laws to impact the number of providers. Though the evidence is 
somewhat mixed, some work suggests that physicians avoid areas with high 
malpractice pressure.215 Similarly, more APRNs and PAs work in areas that (1) have 
low malpractice pressure and (2) grant them more autonomy.216 Accordingly, 
relaxing SOP laws in areas with low malpractice pressure may result in a larger 
marginal increase in the supply of APRNs and PAs relative to a similar relaxation of 
laws in areas with high malpractice pressure. This would have the effect of 
magnifying the impacts discussed above, with C-section rates decreasing even more 
in areas with low malpractice pressure and decreasing even less (or increasing) in 
areas with high malpractice pressure than would occur absent changes in the supply 
of providers.  
In general, the interaction of SOP laws and malpractice pressure may have 
important effects on the healthcare workforce and, in turn, on the provision of 
healthcare. Despite the importance of these factors, no prior work has investigated 
how the interaction of SOP laws and malpractice pressure may impact the delivery 
of healthcare. This Article fills that gap in the literature by specifically investigating 
the impact of these different legal regimes on the provision of obstetric care.  
C. Empirical Methodology  
The goal of the empirical analysis is to generate evidence on the causal impact of 
SOP laws and malpractice pressure on the provision of obstetric care. Establishing a 
causal relationship between legal changes and healthcare outcomes—as opposed to 
merely an association between the two—is not straightforward. Ideally, I would 
conduct a laboratory-type experiment in which some providers would be randomly 
assigned to practice under relaxed SOP laws and others would be assigned to practice 
under restrictive SOP laws.217 This assignment would further vary so that some 
providers practiced subject to high malpractice pressure and others to low 
malpractice pressure. This type of random assignment would facilitate a 
straightforward statistical analysis that could reveal the causal impacts of these legal 
changes on the provision of obstetric care. While such a laboratory-type experiment 
is not possible for a variety of ethical, political, legal, and financial reasons, the goal 
of my empirical analysis is to mimic such an experiment as closely as possible, 
 
 
 215. See David A. Matsa, Does Malpractice Liability Keep the Doctor Away? Evidence 
from Tort Reform Damage Caps, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. S143, S165 (2007) (finding that reducing 
malpractice pressure via tort reform does not increase the supply of physicians generally but 
does increase the supply of specialist physicians in rural areas).  
 216. McMichael, supra note 4, at 764–65.  
 217. See J. Shahar Dillbary, Griffin Edwards & Fredrick E. Vars, Why Exempting 
Negligent Doctors May Reduce Suicide: An Empirical Analysis, 93 IND. L.J. 457, 482 (2018) 
(referring to a laboratory experiment as the “gold standard”); Michael D. Frakes, The 
Surprising Relevance of Medical Malpractice Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 364 (2015) 
(discussing idealized laboratory settings when examining the impact of changes in laws). 
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eliminating as many potential confounding factors as possible in order to isolate the 
effects of the legal regimes under investigation.  
One way to achieve this goal is to use what has been called a natural policy 
experiment to draw causal inferences about the effect of different legal regimes. 
Here, the primary “treatment” under investigation is whether an individual provider 
practices under a relaxed or restrictive SOP regime. Further, these regimes are 
layered on top of areas with high or low malpractice pressure. Because some states 
changed their SOP laws while others did not and because states experienced different 
levels of malpractice pressure, “treatment” (states with a particular type of SOP law 
or malpractice pressure) and “control” groups are readily available for analysis. 
However, while the adoption of new SOP laws at different points in time by different 
states, which also experienced different levels of malpractice pressure, offers 
convenient “treatment” and “control” groups, the assignment of any given state to 
one of these groups is almost certainly not random. Without random assignment to 
these groups, the simple statistical comparisons one might see in a laboratory setting 
are not sufficient to provide evidence of the causal effects of legal changes on the 
provision of healthcare.  
Focusing on the effect of APRN SOP laws on C-sections as an example,218 one 
straightforward way to examine this effect is to simply compare births in states that 
allow APRNs to practice independently with births in states that restrict APRNs’ 
practices. By doing so, it is possible to calculate differences in the probability that a 
particular patient receives a C-section in the two different groups. However, this 
calculation does not yield evidence of a causal relationship because individual states 
differ along many dimensions beyond their APRN SOP laws (e.g., differences in 
myriad other laws and differences in the availability of healthcare or health 
insurance). These differences, many of which are hidden in even the best datasets, 
would almost certainly confound any attempt to estimate the effect of APRN SOP 
laws by simply comparing obstetric outcomes across states. To address these issues, 
another way to analyze the impact of APRN SOP laws is to compare obstetric 
outcomes within the same state before and after that state changes its SOP law. 
Unfortunately, this approach also suffers from problems, as provider treatment 
patterns, health care norms, legal norms, and many other factors are almost certainly 
changing over time for many different reasons. Even if information on all these 
factors were available—and often such information does not exist—disentangling 
the impacts of all these factors from the impact of APRN SOP laws on C-sections 
would be impossible.  
The fundamental issue with both of these approaches is the absence of a valid 
control group. Using either approach, there are good reasons to believe that different 
factors may systematically affect births occurring both when APRNs can practice 
independently and when APRNs are restricted. To address these issues and construct 
a valid counterfactual against which to compare the “treatment” group, social 
scientists rely on difference-in-differences models. These models involve 
undertaking both of the calculations above simultaneously. Specifically, these 
models allow for the comparison of trends in C-sections over time across the treated 
 
 
 218. The discussion here is applicable to all of the legal regimes and obstetric outcomes 
under investigation. I focus on APRN SOP laws and C-sections solely for ease of explanation.  
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and control groups. By doing so, it is possible to account for factors that may 
influence C-sections—even if it is impossible to observe the factors themselves—
and thereby isolate the amount of change in C-section rates that is attributable to 
APRN independence. In other words, difference-in-differences models “difference 
out” all of the unobserved factors that may affect birth outcomes over time and within 
individual states, thus isolating the causal effect of APRN independence (or any other 
legal regime under investigation).  
As a hypothetical example, consider Kentucky and Tennessee. Suppose that 
Tennessee passed a law that took effect in 2013 granting APRNs independence, 
while Kentucky never passed such a law. Suppose further that the numbers of C-
sections per 100 births in Kentucky and Tennessee in 2012 were 35 and 50, 
respectively. In 2013, these rates each decreased to 25 and 30, respectively. Assume 
that, had Tennessee never passed its new SOP law, C-section rates there would have 
followed the same trend they followed in Kentucky. Simply comparing Kentucky 
and Tennessee in 2013 would suggest that allowing APRNs to practice 
independently results in 5 fewer C-sections. Comparing Tennessee to itself before 
and after it passed the new law would suggest that APRN independence is associated 
with 20 fewer C-sections. However, neither of these calculations isolates the role of 
APRN independence in C-section rates. To isolate this effect, calculating a 
difference-in-differences is necessary. First, I calculate the differences in C-sections 
in both Kentucky (25 – 35 = -10) and Tennessee (30 – 50 = -20) before and after 
Tennessee passed its new law. Second, I calculate the difference between the two 
differences from step one (i.e. -20 – (-10) = -10) to conclude that APRN 
independence reduces C-sections by 10. Because this calculation effectively nets out 
the idiosyncratic, unobservable factors unique to Tennessee, as well as factors that 
change over time in both states, it isolates the effect of APRN independence on C-
section rates.  
Extending this approach to examine whether granting APRNs independence has 
a differential effect across different levels of malpractice pressure, suppose that 
North Carolina also began allowing APRNs to practice independently in 2013 and 
that North Carolina experiences higher levels of malpractice pressure than 
Tennessee. Assume that C-section rates per 100 births in North Carolina were 40 and 
28 in 2012 and 2013, respectively. Repeating the difference-in-differences 
calculation for North Carolina, again using Kentucky as the control state, implies 
that APRN independence decreases C-sections by 2.219 Comparing this result to the 
earlier result—a decrease of 10—implies that, while granting APRNs independence 
always results in lower C-section rates, the size of this decrease is larger in states 
with low malpractice pressure than states with high malpractice pressure.  
While this straightforward example focusing on APRN independence, two levels 
of malpractice pressure, and C-section rates captures the essence of my empirical 
approach, the actual empirical models are substantially more complex. These models 
exploit the staggered adoption of changes in both APRN and PA SOP laws across 
 
 
 219. First, I calculate the differences in C-section rates in Kentucky (25 – 35 = –10) and 
North Carolina (28 – 40 = –12) before and after North Carolina passed its new law. Second, I 
calculate the differences from step one (–12 – (–10) = –2) to conclude that APRN 
independence decreases C-section rates by 2.  
2020] HEALTHCARE LICENSING AND LIABILITY  861 
 
 
four different levels of malpractice pressure. And they extend to outcomes beyond 
C-sections. With over sixty-nine million observations included in the primary 
models, they take advantage of a rich set of information to arrive at robust estimates 
of the roles that SOP laws and malpractice pressure play in obstetric outcomes.  
Throughout the analysis, I estimate ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
models. Complete technical details on these models, including the full econometric 
specification, are provided in the Technical Appendix.220 The dependent variable in 
each model is an indicator variable that equals one when a specified outcome occurs 
and zero otherwise. The mean of an indicator variable is an estimate of the 
probability with which the relevant outcome occurs.221 For example, an indicator 
variable for C-sections equals one when a C-section is performed in a given birth. 
Among 200 births, 60 of which involved a C-section, the mean of the relevant 
indicator would be 0.3,222 implying a C-section rate of 30%. Because regression 
models estimate the change in the conditional mean of the dependent variable 
attributable to different independent variables, the models I estimate can provide 
estimates of the change in the probability of a given outcome occurring attributable 
to different independent variables.  
Across multiple models, I examine several different outcomes. First, when 
examining C-sections, the dependent variable in each model is an indicator for 
whether a C-section was performed. The primary model focuses on all births and C-
sections. Subsequent models maintain the same dependent variable but are limited 
to low-risk births and high-risk births. I also separately examine elective C-sections 
and VBACs, and in those models, the dependent variable is an indicator for whether 
an elective C-section or VBAC was performed, respectively. Second, when 
examining inductions, the primary models include as the dependent variable an 
indicator for whether labor was medically induced. Subsequent models include an 
indicator for whether an elective induction was performed. Finally, to examine the 
effect of APRN SOP laws on the rate at which CNMs attend births, I estimate models 
that include an indicator for whether a CNM was the provider responsible for the 
birth as the dependent variable.223  
Throughout the analysis, I estimate linear probability models (LPM).224 In each 
model focusing on APRN SOP laws and malpractice pressure, I include an indicator 
 
 
 220. McMichael, supra note 31. 
 221. See Currie & MacLeod, supra note 16, at 818, 821 (interpreting the results of models 
with indicator variables as the dependent variables as changes in probabilities); McMichael et 
al., supra note 144, at 372–75 (making the same interpretation).  
   222.    Here, the mean is: (଺଴×ଵ)ା(ଵସ଴×଴)
ଶ଴଴
= 0.3.  
 223. Because PA laws do not directly impact the ability of CNMs to attend births, I limit 
my analysis of CNM-attended births to consider only APRN SOP laws.  
 224. LPMs are OLS regression models that include an indicator as the dependent variable. 
I estimate LPMs instead of nonlinear models, such as probit and logit models, in my analysis 
because this analysis focuses on the interaction between indicator variables. As prior work has 
noted, interpreting interaction terms in nonlinear models is not straightforward. Chunrong Ai 
& Edward C. Norton, Interaction Terms in Logit and Probit Models, 80 ECON. LETTERS 123, 
123–30 (2003). Prior work focusing on similar outcomes has likewise employed LPMs instead 
of nonlinear models. Markowitz et al., supra note 10, at 207; Currie & MacLeod, supra note 
16, at 818.  
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variable for whether a birth took place in a state and year in which APRNs were 
allowed to practice independently, separate indicator variables for different levels of 
malpractice pressure, and an interaction between the APRN independence indicator 
variable and the malpractice pressure indicators. When focusing on PA SOP laws 
and malpractice pressure, an indicator for PA autonomy replaces the indicator for 
APRN independence.  
Because the primary models involve multiple indicator variables and interactions 
between them, I report the primary results graphically to facilitate interpretation. 
Specifically, after estimating the regression models, I use the estimated coefficients 
to calculate the effect of APRN independence (or PA autonomy) across different 
levels of malpractice pressure. In all cases, I use states with restrictive SOP laws—
restricted practice for APRNs and limited practice for PAs—and the lowest levels of 
malpractice pressure as the baseline case. The effects of liberalizing SOP laws across 
different levels of malpractice pressure are then reported as differences from this 
baseline. Complete details on these calculations are provided in the Technical 
Appendix along with complete regression results.225  
In addition to the independent variables of interest, each model includes a series 
of variables to control for factors that may affect the decision of how to deliver the 
infant. Because the mother’s age can influence delivery method, I include a series of 
indicator variables for the mother’s age in five-year increments from fifteen to fifty. 
I also include a series of indicators for the mother’s race (African American or black, 
Asian, Native American, and Hispanic with white as the omitted category) and 
education level (unknown education level, less than high school, high school, some 
college, and college with more than college as the omitted category). Finally, I 
include an indicator for whether the infant is female and a series of indicators for 
multiple births. Collectively, these variables control for demographic and medical 
factors that prior work has shown can influence obstetric outcomes, thereby better 
allowing the models to isolate the impact of SOP laws and malpractice pressure from 
these other factors.226 Importantly, all of the models include indicator variables for 
states and years. The inclusion of these variables is the key to estimating difference-
in-differences models as described above. These state and year indicators control for 
idiosyncratic, unobserved factors specific to each state and linear and nonlinear 
trends in the outcomes of interest over time, respectively. Throughout the analysis, I 
cluster the standard errors at the state and year levels to account for the possibility of 
serial autocorrelation.227 
225. McMichael, supra note 31.
226. See Frakes, supra note 99, at 262 n.11 (noting that his models focusing on obstetric
outcomes include similar control variables). 
227. To address the possibility that obstetric outcomes are correlated within particular
states and years, I estimate standard errors clustered at the state and year levels. See Marianne 
Bertrand, Esther Duflo & Sendhil Mullainathan, How Much Should We Trust Differences-In-
Differences Estimates?, 119 Q.J. ECON. 249, 254 (2004) (noting that clustering can address 
the problem of serial autocorrelation).  
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D. Results and Discussion  
Before delving into the different effects of SOP laws across different levels of 
malpractice pressure, I first examine SOP laws in isolation to determine whether, 
using my classification scheme, the estimated effects of these laws are consistent 
with prior work.228 Figure 4 reports results for the effects of different SOP laws on 
obstetric outcomes. Panel A reports the results from a series of regressions that focus 
on the effect of allowing APRNs to practice independently, and Panel B provides 
similar results focusing on the effect of allowing PAs to practice autonomously.229 
Each point represents the effect of the relevant SOP law on the given obstetric 
outcome,230 and the bars represent the 90% confidence intervals.231 Focusing on the 
APRN SOP law results in Panel A, allowing APRNs to practice independently 
results in a 0.8 percentage point increase in the probability of having a CNM attend 
a birth. While this may seem like a small change, it represents an 11% increase 
relative to states that do not allow APRNs to practice independently, implying that 
relaxing SOP laws better allows APRNs to provide care to patients.  
 
 
 228. See Markowitz et al., supra note 10, at 209–16 (reporting the results of models that 
used a different classification of SOP laws). 
 229. Each point represents a coefficient estimate derived from a separate regression model. 
Individual models include an indicator variable for whether APRNs may practice 
independently, a full set of control variables, and a full set of state and year fixed effects. Full 
regression results are available in the Technical Appendix, supra note 31.  
 230. Because all of the regression models have an indicator as the dependent variable, each 
coefficient may be interpreted as a percentage point change in the probability that the outcome 
of interest occurs. To facilitate interpretation, Figure 2 reports the marginal effects (in terms 
of percentage point changes) instead of the raw coefficient estimates.  
 231. When the bar representing the confidence interval does not intersect with the vertical 
line indicating zero, the effect associated with that bar is statistically significant.  
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Figure 4: Effect of Scope-of-Practice Laws on Labor and Delivery Procedures 
 
Panel A: Effect of APRN Scope-of-Practice Laws 
Panel B: Effect of PA Scope-of-Practice Laws 
 
Note: Each point represents the coefficient on APRN independence (Panel A) or PA autonomy 
(Panel B). Error bars represent the 90% confidence intervals and are calculated based on 
standard errors clustered at the state and year levels. Each point is derived from a separate 
regression model. The dependent variable in each model is an indicator for whether the birth 
involved the outcome listed on the left. All regression models include a full set of control 
variables and state and year fixed effects. 
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As with the probability that a CNM attends a birth, APRN SOP laws have their 
anticipated effect on the other labor and delivery outcomes. The probability a patient 
receives a C-section decreases by 1 percentage point—a 3% decline relative to states 
that restrict the practices of APRNs. C-sections on high- and low-risk patients decline 
by 1.3 and 0.9 percentage points, respectively, and elective C-sections decrease by 
0.8 percentage points. Similarly, allowing APRNs to practice independently reduces 
inductions and elective inductions by 1.5 and 1.6 percentage points, respectively. 
Consistent with the reduction in C-sections, the rate of VBACs increases slightly by 
0.3 percentage points.232  
As the results reported in Panel B indicate, 233 allowing PAs to practice with 
autonomy has the anticipated effects on labor and delivery outcomes.234 PA 
autonomy has approximately the same impact on C-sections and low-risk C-sections 
as APRN independence. However, at a 2.8 percentage point reduction in high-risk 
C-sections, PA autonomy has a larger impact than APRN independence. This larger 
impact is consistent with PAs focusing on more medically complex patients than 
APRNs. The effect of PA autonomy on inductions and elective inductions is less 
than half the magnitude of the effect of APRN independence, and the effect on 
elective inductions is not statistically significant. Again, these effects are consistent 
with PAs focusing more on medically complex patients and APRNs having a broader 
impact on less complex patients. Finally, PA autonomy slightly increases VBAC 
rates, but not as much as APRN independence.  
Overall, the results for APRN SOP laws are consistent with prior work,235 despite 
the use of somewhat different classifications of these laws. And the results for PA 
laws, while smaller in magnitude than those for APRN laws, demonstrate that 
allowing PAs to practice with more autonomy can impact the delivery of healthcare. 
Importantly, the results in Panel B represent the first empirical evidence of an effect 
of PA SOP laws on the provision of obstetric care. 
Extending the analysis to examine the joint effect of SOP laws and malpractice 
liability, Figures 5–7 present the effect of SOP laws across different levels of 
malpractice pressure. These figures summarize a series of regression results to 
illustrate the joint impact of SOP laws and malpractice pressure on obstetric care. In 
particular, each point in these figures represents the effect of the specified SOP law 
in the specified malpractice quartile.236 In all figures, the baseline (for purposes of 
 
 
 232. A reduction in C-section rates has countervailing effects on VBAC rates. On one 
hand, fewer C-sections means more vaginal births, which should increase VBAC rates. On the 
other hand, fewer C-sections means that there are fewer patients who have previously had a 
C-section and thus fewer patients who can vaginally deliver after a C-section. The estimates 
reported here represent the combined effect of these two mechanisms.  
 233. Because PA SOP laws do not legally affect the practices of CNMs, the specification 
with an indicator for whether PA autonomy impacts the probability that a CNM attends a birth 
is omitted. In general, PA autonomy does not have a statistically significant effect on this 
outcome.  
 234. Full regression results are available in the Technical Appendix, supra note 31.  
 235. See Markowitz et al., supra note 10, at 209–16 (reporting similar results). 
 236. Each point represents the effect of the given SOP law within the given malpractice 
pressure quartile and is calculated from the individual coefficient estimates from a regression 
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comparison) is the most restrictive SOP law in the first malpractice pressure quartile. 
The bars connected to each point represent the 90% confidence intervals.237 
 Figure 5 reports the joint effect of APRN SOP laws and malpractice pressure on 
the probability that a CNM attends a birth (Panel A) and the probability that the 
patient undergoes a C-section (Panel B). At low levels of malpractice pressure, 
allowing APRNs to practice independently has the anticipated effect—CNM-
attended births increase and C-sections decrease. However, these effects clearly 
dissipate as malpractice pressure increases. The probability of undergoing a C-
section in a state that allows APRNs to practice independently and has the highest 
level of malpractice pressure is almost exactly the same as the probability of 
undergoing a C-section in a state that restricts the practices of APRNs but has the 
lowest level of malpractice pressure.238 Similarly, while the probability of having a 
CNM attend a birth increases by 2 percentage points in states with the lowest levels 
of malpractice pressure once APRNs can practice independently, CNMs are slightly 
less likely to attend a birth in states that allow independent practice and have the 
highest levels of malpractice pressure.  
  
 
 
model that includes an indicator for APRN independence, indicators for different malpractice 
pressure quartiles, and interactions between the APRN independence indicator and the 
malpractice pressure quartile indicators. Full details of this calculation are provided in the 
Technical Appendix, supra note 31.  
 237. When the bar representing the confidence interval does not intersect with the vertical 
line indicating zero, the effect associated with that bar is statistically significant.  
 238. Of note is the fact that the restricted-practice and APRN-independence lines never 
cross in Figure 5. Thus, while the probability of undergoing a C-section is approximately the 
same in the highest malpractice pressure quartile in independence states and the lowest 
malpractice pressure quartile in restricted-practice states, allowing APRNs to practice 
independently always reduces C-section rates. Comparing independence states and restricted-
practice states in the highest malpractice pressure quartile (the two rightmost points) 
demonstrates that the independence states have lower C-section rates.  
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Figure 5: Effect of APRN Scope-of-Practice Laws on Delivery Outcomes 
Panel A: CNMs     Panel B: C-Sections 
Note: Each point represents the effect of the given SOP law within the given malpractice 
pressure quartile. Each point is calculated from the individual coefficient estimates from a 
regression model that includes a full set of control variables and state and year fixed effects. 
Error bars represent the 90% confidence intervals, which are based on standard errors 
clustered at the state and year levels. 
 
Collectively, these CNM and C-section results demonstrate that the effect of SOP 
laws is not constant across different levels of malpractice pressure. And, importantly, 
these results are consistent with the threat of liability impacting the decisions made 
by individual healthcare providers. They suggest that CNMs are less willing to attend 
births after being granted independence in areas with high malpractice pressure. 
Instead, CNMs continue to rely on physician supervision and the shifting of liability 
(toward physicians) that this entails. As demonstrated by the relatively flat line (and 
lack of statistical significance) for CNM-attended births in states that restrict APRN 
practices, CNMs do not generally respond to malpractice pressure in states that 
require physician supervision. However, they clearly respond—by attending fewer 
births—to malpractice pressure in states where they can practice independently and 
bear more responsibility for their own malpractice.  
A similar pattern is present in the C-section results. While allowing APRNs to 
practice independently results in a relatively large decrease in the probability of a C-
section when malpractice pressure is low, it has essentially no effect when 
malpractice pressure is high. At the same time, C-section rates remain relatively 
stable across different levels of malpractice pressure in states that restrict APRN 
practices. Thus, these results suggest that APRNs respond to malpractice pressure 
when they can practice independently and therefore bear greater malpractice risk. 
This is consistent with malpractice liability exerting a greater deterrent effect when 
APRNs can practice independently.239  
 
 
 239. While these results demonstrate that malpractice pressure exerts greater deterrence 
when APRNs can practice independently, that does not necessarily mean that it induces the 
optimal level of C-sections. Rather, the results only imply that APRNs respond more strongly 
to malpractice pressure when they can practice independently.  
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The results in Figure 6 tell a similar story, with APRN independence having the 
greatest effect on the use of C-sections in high-risk and low-risk pregnancies at the 
lowest levels of malpractice pressure (Panels A and B). APRN independence also 
has a larger negative effect on elective C-sections at low levels of malpractice 
pressure and, interestingly, has a positive effect on elective C-section rates at the 
highest levels of malpractice liability (Panel C). Since elective C-sections are, by 
definition, not medically indicated and therefore most susceptible to the influence of 
nonmedical factors, such as malpractice liability, the positive and statistically 
significant effect of high malpractice pressure and APRN independence suggest that 
APRNs respond to malpractice pressure more strongly when they face higher 
malpractice liability risk for their own acts and omissions.  
Figure 6: Effect of APRN Scope-of-Practice Laws on C-sections 
Panel A: High Risk   Panel B: Low Risk 
Panel C: Elective 
Note: Each point represents the effect of the given SOP law within the given malpractice 
pressure quartile. Each point is calculated from the individual coefficient estimates from a 
regression model that includes a full set of control variables and state and year fixed effects. 
Error bars represent the 90% confidence intervals, which are based on standard errors 
clustered at the state and year levels. 
 
In the interest of succinctness, the effects of APRN SOP laws across different 
levels of malpractice pressure on inductions and VBACs are reported in Figure A1 
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in the Technical Appendix.240 In general, the joint effect of APRN SOP laws and 
malpractice pressure on these outcomes is not as clear as on C-sections. Figure A1 
provides evidence that SOP laws alone affect these outcomes, but the lines for 
restricted practice and independent practice generally follow similar patterns. Unlike 
the C-section results, in which the two lines converged, the relatively parallel paths 
in Figure A1 suggest that the effect of APRN independence does not vary 
substantially across different levels of malpractice pressure. This lack of an effect, 
however, provides some support for the conclusion that healthcare providers respond 
to the threat of liability, as inductions and VBACs do not involve the same risk 
calculations (in terms of liability) as C-sections.  
With respect to PAs and the SOP laws that govern them, a similar pattern of 
effects emerges. Figure 7 reports the joint effect of malpractice pressure and PA laws 
on C-sections. As reported in Panel A, which focuses on all C-sections, allowing PAs 
to practice autonomously generally lowers C-section rates. However, as with 
allowing APRNs to practice independently, this negative effect dissipates as 
malpractice pressure increases. This pattern of effects is most obvious in C-section 
rates among low-risk pregnancies (reported in Panel C), though it is apparent in C-
sections generally (Panel A) and C-section rates among high-risk pregnancies (Panel 
B) as well. However, the limited practice and autonomous practice lines in Panel D 
of Figure 7 are nearly parallel, suggesting that the effect of allowing PAs to practice 
autonomously on elective C-sections does not vary substantially across different 
levels of malpractice pressure. Since elective C-sections would be particularly 
sensitive to malpractice pressure, these results imply PA SOP laws do not interact as 
strongly with malpractice pressure as APRN SOP laws. This, however, is not 
surprising because physicians always bear some responsibility for the actions of PAs, 
meaning the marginal effect of changing SOP laws across different levels of 
malpractice pressure is smaller for PAs than APRNs.  
  
 
 
 240. Technical Appendix, supra note 31, at A10.  
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Figure 7: Effect of PA Scope-of-Practice Laws on C-sections 
  Panel A: C-sections    Panel B: High Risk 
  
Panel C: Low Risk    Panel D: Elective 
Note: Each point represents the effect of the given SOP law within the given malpractice 
pressure quartile. Each point is calculated from the individual coefficient estimates from a 
regression model that includes a full set of control variables and state and year fixed effects. 
Error bars represent the 90% confidence intervals, which are based on standard errors 
clustered at the state and year levels. 
 
Again, in the interest of succinctness, Figure A2 in the Technical Appendix reports 
the joint effect of PA SOP laws and malpractice pressure on inductions, elective 
inductions, and VBACs.241 With respect to inductions and elective inductions, no 
obvious pattern emerges—either one that supports a clear effect of SOP laws 
individually, a clear effect of malpractice liability individually, or a clear joint effect. 
This lack of a clear effect is consistent with PAs not playing substantial roles in 
inductions. With respect to VBACs, there is a slight convergence in the limited 
practice and autonomous practice lines, particularly in the fourth quartile of 
malpractice pressure, but this convergence is relatively subtle compared to the other 
procedures examined here.  
Overall, the results demonstrate that SOP laws impact the delivery of healthcare 
but that this impact is not constant across different levels of malpractice pressure. 
Allowing APRNs and PAs to practice independently and autonomously generally 
 
 
 241. Id. at A11.  
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lowers the probability with which an infant is delivered via C-section, but this decline 
is most pronounced in areas with low malpractice pressure. As malpractice pressure 
increases, this decline becomes less pronounced, and in some cases, even becomes 
an increase. This change in effect is consistent with APRNs, PAs, physicians, and 
other providers responding to the threat of malpractice liability. Attributing this 
change in effect to liability is supported by the general lack of a difference in effect 
of SOP laws across different levels of malpractice pressure on inductions. Relative 
to C-sections (and VBACs), inductions are generally less risky in terms of 
malpractice liability. Thus, the evidence that SOP laws have a relatively constant 
effect on inductions across different levels of malpractice pressure suggests that the 
different effects observed for C-sections stem from the threat of liability. Given these 
effects, a relevant question is whether the observed differences in choice of 
procedure attributable to SOP laws and malpractice pressure lead to different health 
outcomes.  
Results for the joint effect of SOP laws and malpractice pressure on health 
outcomes are reported in the Technical Appendix.242 Focusing just on SOP laws, I 
find that these laws either improve the health outcomes of both mothers and infants 
or have no statistically significant effect, with APRN SOP laws generally having 
stronger effects than PA SOP laws. This suggests that the results above indicating a 
decrease in the intensity of treatment for millions of women do not imply that these 
women or their infants suffer poorer health outcomes. Indeed, if anything, the 
decrease in treatment intensity results in improved health outcomes for both mothers 
and infants.243 Extending the analysis to examine the joint effect of SOP laws and 
malpractice pressure, I find some evidence of a joint effect. However, this evidence 
is generally weaker than that reported above, suggesting that, while the choice of 
delivery method is highly sensitive to SOP laws and malpractice pressure, health 
outcomes are less so.  
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND A NEW APPROACH TO PATIENT SAFETY 
Across multiple models focusing on different obstetric outcomes, I find strong 
and consistent evidence that relaxing the SOP laws governing APRNs and PAs 
affects obstetric outcomes and that this effect varies depending on the level of 
malpractice pressure faced by providers. This differential effect across different 
levels of malpractice pressure is consistent with the anticipated effects described 
above. It also suggests that restrictive SOP laws increase the malpractice risk faced 
by physicians and lower this risk for APRNs and PAs because, without this risk 
shifting in the first instance, there is no reasonable way to explain the differential 
effect of liberalizing SOP laws across different levels of malpractice pressure. This 
Part explores the policy implications of these results.244 It first discusses how these 
 
 
 242. Id.  
 243. These results are consistent with the WHO’s conclusions that C-section rates above 
10% do not generally improve population health outcomes and may actually result in poorer 
outcomes. See Betrán et al., supra note 25. 
 244. One set of important implications not fully explored here is how gender affects the 
results reported above in at least two specific ways. First, with respect to malpractice liability, 
Jamie Abrams has argued that gender expectations distort tort law as applied to obstetric care 
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results fit into the current understanding of licensing laws. Next, it explores how the 
results, combined with prior evidence, suggest a new understanding of the role of 
malpractice liability in the provision of healthcare. Finally, it uses the consistent 
evidence of a joint effect of SOP laws and malpractice pressure to suggest a novel 
way to resolve the ongoing debate over SOP laws by incorporating malpractice 
liability and tort law into this debate.  
A. The Role of Licensing Laws in the Provision of Healthcare 
In general, the results of my empirical analysis add to a growing body of evidence 
that allowing APRNs to practice independently generates important benefits for 
patients. The results for APRN SOP laws are consistent with prior work and build 
on the existing body of evidence in two important ways. First, while prior work has 
narrowly focused on the laws governing CNMs,245 the analysis here examines the 
laws governing APRNs more generally (including CNMs).246 Second, in examining 
APRNs more broadly, the analysis here considers a different classification of APRN 
SOP laws than that used by the Markowitz study and other prior work.247 This 
classification scheme focuses more specifically on individual laws and can therefore 
provide policymakers important information about which laws to amend if they wish 
to achieve lower C-section rates and treatment intensity consistent with WHO 
guidelines. 
With respect to PA SOP laws, the results reported here are the first empirical 
evidence concerning the effect of these laws on obstetric outcomes and some of the 
first rigorous empirical evidence on PA SOP laws more generally. In general, PA 
SOP laws have not received the same amount of attention in the academic literature 
as have APRN SOP laws. This may stem from the facts that APRNs outnumber PAs, 
classifications of PA SOP laws are less readily available, and PAs can never practice 
independently (meaning the differences in PA SOP laws are subtler). Whatever the 
reason, PAs can clearly impact the provision of healthcare and the evidence 
 
 
because of its tendency to emphasize fetal harm over maternal harm. Jamie R. Abrams, 
Distorted and Diminished Tort Claims for Women, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1955, 1995–97 
(2013). Second, Nancy Lugo has argued that SOP laws also raise gender implications because 
APRNs are more often women, though her argument is not specific to obstetric care. Nancy 
Rudner Lugo, Full Practice Authority for Advanced Practice Registered Nurses Is a Gender 
Issue, ONLINE J. ISSUES NURSING (May 2016), http://ojin.nursingworld.org/MainMenuCategor 
ies/ANAMarketplace/ANAPeriodicals/OJIN/TableofContents/Vol-21-2016/No2-May-2016 
/Articles-Previous-Topics/Full-Practice-Authority-for-APRN.html [https://perma.cc/M6QD-
RM5Z]. While exploring the gendered implications of the results is beyond the scope of this 
Article, future work could fruitfully explore these important issues. 
 245. See, e.g., Markowitz et al., supra note 10, at 209–16; D. Mark Anderson, Ryan Brown, 
Kerwin Kofi Charles & Daniel I. Rees, The Effect of Occupational Licensing on Consumer 
Welfare: Early Midwifery Laws and Maternal Mortality 6–9 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 22456, 2016).  
 246. While CNMs certainly play a central role in the delivery of obstetric care, other types 
of APRNs may directly and indirectly impact the provision of obstetric care (e.g., by providing 
prenatal care that obviates the need for a more intensive intervention at the time of delivery). 
 247. Markowitz et al., supra note 10, at 203–04; see also, e.g., Kleiner et al., supra note 
10, at 263–66.  
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presented here begins to fill an important gap in the understanding of healthcare 
workforce regulations and the effects of these regulations on healthcare outcomes.  
The results for PA SOP laws suggest that, while amending these laws may not 
lead to as large or as pervasive of an effect on obstetric care as amending those 
governing APRNs, PA SOP laws can nonetheless impact the delivery of obstetric 
care. The effects of PA laws are generally concentrated on individual procedure 
choices—and less on outcomes affected by the availability of nonsurgical care—but 
the size and statistical significance of these effects demonstrates that reducing the 
restrictiveness of PA SOP laws should be considered alongside other strategies as a 
viable option to impact the provision of healthcare.  
B. A New Understanding of Malpractice Liability 
In addition to providing new evidence on the role of SOP laws, the results 
presented here offer new insight into the role malpractice liability plays in the 
healthcare system, particularly its propensity to interact with other legal regimes. 
Before delving into the implications of those interactions, however, it is worth noting 
that the results elucidate an underappreciated aspect of malpractice liability in 
healthcare. Specifically, the results reported here, when combined with existing 
empirical evidence, suggest that the size of the payments providers must make to 
resolve claims does not drive changes in their behavior. Rather, the prevalence and 
allocation of these payments appear to play more salient roles in determining how 
providers deliver care.  
Much of the existing research on the role of tort liability in healthcare has focused 
on tort reforms designed specifically to reduce the size of malpractice awards and 
settlements. Caps on noneconomic damages have been at the center of many 
studies.248 However, the evidence of the effectiveness of these caps, which focus 
explicitly on the size of awards, is mixed.249 On the other hand, the evidence on the 
effect of legal changes that reallocate liability consistently shows that this 
reallocation impacts healthcare delivery. For example, Currie and MacLeod found 
that joint and several liability reform, which results in a reallocation of liability 
among physicians and hospitals, has a significant impact on obstetric care.250 Frakes 
found that changing the standard of care (which determines whether a provider is 
liable in the first place) similarly has a significant effect on obstetric care.251 The 
results presented here demonstrate that changes to SOP laws, which can affect the 
ability of patients to hold physicians liable and therefore affect the allocation of 
liability between physicians, APRNs, and PAs, result in changes in the delivery of 
obstetric care. Collectively, this evidence suggests that changes in how malpractice 
liability is allocated or determined in the first instance may result in more substantial 
 
 
 248. See MELLO & KACHALIA, supra note 18, at 33–39 (reviewing many of these studies). 
 249. See id. at 36 (“A reasonable conclusion to draw from this group of studies is that 
noneconomic damages caps have been shown to be associated with reductions in some, albeit 
not all, indicators of defensive medicine. The evidence about effects on healthcare spending 
is too varied to support a strong conclusion.”); see also Paik et al., supra note 112, at 85 
(explaining that they find mixed evidence on the effect of noneconomic damages caps).  
 250. Currie & MacLeod, supra note 16, at 819–21.  
 251. Frakes, supra note 99, at 268–71.  
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changes in the behavior of healthcare providers than reforms that affect the size of 
damages awards. As policymakers continue to debate the contours of tort law and 
malpractice liability, this evidence can inform the decisions that will determine the 
functioning of tort law going forward.  
Turning next to the more specific contribution of the empirical analysis, the 
results demonstrate that providers respond to malpractice liability differently 
depending on the SOP laws in place, as the effects of restrictive SOP laws vary across 
different levels of malpractice pressure. This variation is consistent with SOP laws 
shifting risk among providers, increasing the risk of liability for physicians, and 
reducing it for APRNs and PAs. If restrictive SOP laws did not shift risk in this way, 
then there would be no differential response to different levels of malpractice 
pressure when SOP laws are relaxed. Instead, relaxing a particular SOP law would 
generate the same change in the outcome of interest across all levels of malpractice 
pressure. Thus, by demonstrating that relaxing SOP laws has different effects at 
different levels of malpractice pressure, the analysis demonstrates that maintaining 
restrictive SOP laws necessarily involves shifting liability risk from some providers 
to others.  
Far from simply illustrating an intriguing quirk of the legal and healthcare 
systems, the evidence of liability shifting in the presence of restrictive SOP laws and 
of a differential response to malpractice liability when SOP laws are relaxed has 
important implications for the delivery of healthcare. First, the results demonstrate 
that APRNs and PAs, like physicians, respond to the threat of liability by changing 
how they provide care.252 CNMs attend fewer births when malpractice pressure is 
high and when they face this pressure without the risk shifting of restrictive SOP 
laws. Similarly, APRNs and PAs do less to reduce treatment intensity (as measured 
by C-section and induction rates) when their liability risk increases. While this 
evidence alone is probably not sufficient to conclude that APRNs and PAs practice 
defensive medicine, it may be suggestive of that conclusion.253 And it is certainly 
consistent with the conclusion that APRNs and PAs respond to the threat of 
malpractice liability. In other words, the evidence demonstrates that tort law can 
exert a deterrent effect on APRNs and PAs.  
Second, the empirical evidence suggests that, by shifting liability risk among 
providers, restrictive SOP laws add a layer of complication to the legal and 
healthcare systems to the detriment of patients. Prior research has indicated that C-
section rates in the United States are too high and that high levels of malpractice 
liability risk can exacerbate this problem.254 By adding an additional layer of liability 
considerations (such as whether a particular SOP law increases the chances that a 
physician will be held vicariously liable or be subject to liability for negligent 
supervision) on top of existing considerations (such as whether performing C-
sections reduces liability risk), restrictive SOP laws further complicate and obfuscate 
the already complex incentives created by malpractice liability. This additional layer 
 
 
 252. For an analysis of tort law’s deterrent effect on physicians, see Black et al., supra note 
17, at 109–12.  
 253. A full analysis of whether and to what extent APRNs and PAs practice defensive 
medicine is beyond the scope of the analysis presented here. However, future work should 
explore these questions.  
 254. Betrán et al., supra note 25, at 667; Boerma et al., supra note 154, at 1341.  
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of complication may further exacerbate both the underlying problem of too many C-
sections and impede policymakers’ ability to address this problem by reforming the 
laws governing malpractice liability.  
For example, the evidence suggests that malpractice liability overdeters 
physicians when states maintain restrictive SOP laws because, in addition to their 
own liability risk, they bear direct and vicarious liability risks generated by APRNs 
and PAs. Because physicians are primarily responsible for C-sections, the fact that 
they are overdeterred by malpractice liability in the presence of restrictive SOP laws 
may further exacerbate the problem of high C-section rates. While physicians are 
overdeterred, malpractice liability commensurately underdeters APRNs and PAs 
since some patients will choose to pursue claims against supervising physicians 
instead of the APRNs and PAs who were directly involved in the underlying 
malpractice incident. Thus, within the same malpractice regime, different providers 
face markedly different incentives.  
To the extent that policymakers wish to address inappropriately high C-section 
rates by reforming the laws around malpractice liability, they will face uniquely 
difficult challenges in doing so based on the different incentives created by 
malpractice liability for different types of providers. Any policy that realigns the 
malpractice risk for one group of providers necessarily misaligns it for another group 
of providers. Unless lawmakers can formulate policies that differentially affect 
physicians and APRNs/PAs in ways that precisely offset the difference in incentives 
created by restrictive SOP laws, addressing the malpractice-risk aspect of C-section 
rates will be next to impossible. While this insight and the empirical results that 
support it may, at first glance, seem discouraging from the perspective of advancing 
the debate over malpractice reform, they have encouraging implications for the 
debate over SOP laws. Indeed, they offer a path to resolving this ongoing and heated 
debate, and the next section follows this path in detail.  
C. Liability as a Solution to the Scope-of-Practice Problem  
In general, states justify SOP laws as necessary to encourage the provision of 
high-quality care and ensure patient safety more generally.255 While these goals are 
certainly important and SOP laws may serve to promote them, overly restrictive SOP 
laws can be both “arbitrary”256 and “anticompetitive,”257 as the available evidence 
does not suggest that restrictive laws are necessary to ensure (or even generally 
promote) patient safety.258 Indeed, “[t]he rationale for restrictive . . . SOP [laws] 
frequently invokes the differential training” completed by APRNs and PAs relative 
 
 
 255. GILMAN & KOSLOV, supra note 8, at 11 (“Together, licensure and scope of practice 
regulations for APRNs and other health care professionals serve important consumer 
protection objectives, including safety and quality.”). 
 256. Kleiner et al., supra note 10, at 264.  
 257. GILMAN & KOSLOV, supra note 8, at 15.  
 258. See GILMAN & KOSLOV, supra note 8, at 7–16, 38 (reviewing the available evidence 
and concluding that restrictive SOP laws are not necessary to promote patient safety); see also 
DUNKER ET AL., supra note 11, at 3–9 (reaching the same conclusion for PA SOP laws); 
SCHIFF, supra note 11, at 4–10 (focusing on APRN SOP laws and reaching the same 
conclusion).  
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to that completed by physicians, as opposed to direct appeals to evidence suggesting 
that granting APRNs and PAs more authority or autonomy will result in greater risks 
to patient safety.259 Contrary to promoting patient safety, SOP laws often serve as 
anticompetitive barriers that insulate physicians from APRN and PA competition in 
markets for healthcare services.260 As such, these laws can reduce access to care,261 
increase the price of care,262 and lead to inappropriate consumption of care.263  
Based on the weight of the evidence demonstrating that restrictive SOP laws do 
little to promote patient safety and generate identifiable harms typically associated 
with anticompetitive restrictions, multiple groups have issued calls for states to relax 
their restrictive laws.264 The National Academy of Medicine stated in 2011 that 
“[n]urses [including APRNs] should practice to the full extent of their education and 
training.”265 The National Governors Association issued a series of reports several 
years later echoing this call for both APRNs and PAs.266 Following these calls, staff 
at the Federal Trade Commission issued a report highlighting the anticompetitive 
harms associated with restrictive SOP laws and urging states to reconsider these 
restrictions.267  
Some states have heeded these calls, but the majority still maintain restrictive 
SOP laws, with less than half of all states allowing APRNs to practice independently 
and no state allowing PAs to do so.268 Prior work has suggested that states may 
maintain their restrictive laws for political reasons. For example, the National 
Academy of Medicine explained that “what nurse practitioners are able to do once 
they graduate varies widely for reasons that are related not to their ability, education 
or training, or safety concerns, but to the political decisions of the state in which they 
work.”269 Evaluating the role of political spending in state legislatures, McMichael 
 
 
 259. Barbara A. Mark & Esita Patel, Nurse Practitioner Scope of Practice: What Do We 
Know and Where Do We Go?, 41 W.J. NURSING RES. 483, 484 (2019).  
 260. GILMAN & KOSLOV, supra note 8, at 15; see also ADAMS & MARKOWITZ, supra note 
9, at 6 (“Currently, there are strong anticompetitive barriers to making more use of advanced 
practice providers (APPs) in the health-care sector.”). 
 261. McMichael, supra note 4, at 759–64. 
 262. See Kleiner et al., supra note 10, at 276–77.  
 263. See Traczynski & Udalova, supra note 77, at 95–100; see also supra Part I (discussing 
the harms associated with restrictive SOP laws).  
 264. One potential resolution to the debate over SOP laws that is attractive because it does 
not require the active participation of state legislatures is the application of federal antitrust 
law. The Supreme Court of the United States recently extended antitrust scrutiny to some 
forms of occupational licensing laws, and this scrutiny could extend to certain SOP laws that 
are based on state regulations. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 
1110–16 (2015). However, the SOP laws that have the greatest effects on APRNs and PAs 
(i.e., those governing physician supervision) are statutory and are thus not subject to antitrust 
scrutiny. See id. at 1116–17; see also McMichael, supra note 13, at 298 (addressing the effect 
of antitrust law on state SOP laws). Accordingly, the SOP law debate continues to occur in 
the halls and chambers of state capitols.  
 265. INST. OF MED., supra note 11, at 4.  
 266. See DUNKER ET AL., supra note 11, at 9–10; SCHIFF, supra note 11, at 10–11.  
 267. See GILMAN & KOSLOV, supra note 8, at 38. 
 268. See supra Part I. 
 269. INST. OF MED., supra note 11, at 5.  
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concluded that “increased political spending by physician interest groups decreases 
the probability that states allow [APRNs] and PAs to practice with more autonomy . 
. . .”270 While McMichael’s analysis included political spending through 2013, the 
political battle over SOP laws has only become more intense since.271 Indeed, the 
American Medical Association (AMA) adopted a resolution in 2017 committing 
itself to “[e]ffectively oppose the continual, nationwide efforts to grant independent 
practice . . . to non-physician practitioners [such as APRNs and PAs, among 
others].”272 Other physician groups, such as the American Academy of Family 
Physicians, have similarly dedicated themselves to opposing the relaxation of SOP 
laws,273 which is not surprising given the clear pecuniary interest of physicians in 
restricting the ability of other providers to compete with them in healthcare services 
markets.274 Groups associated with APRNs and PAs have, unsurprisingly, resisted 
these efforts by physician groups.275 
 
 
 270. McMichael, supra note 13, at 298.  
 271. Interestingly, the results presented here, when coupled with the results from previous 
studies, suggest that physician groups may wish to mollify their stance against relaxing SOP 
laws. While physician groups generally oppose expanding the authority of APRNs and PAs, 
they also vigorously advocate in favor of reforms that will reduce physicians’ liability risk. 
See, e.g., AMA, MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM NOW! 1 (2019) (outlining the AMA’s strong 
support of tort reforms and other measures designed to decrease physicians’ liability risk). 
Prior work has found that physicians’ liability risk increases when states maintain restrictive 
SOP laws, and the empirical analysis here similarly reveals a pattern of effects consistent with 
restrictive SOP laws shifting malpractice pressure away from APRNs and PAs and towards 
physicians. See McMichael et al., supra note 15, at 321 (finding that the number of malpractice 
claims paid by physicians can increase by as much as 31% when states maintain restrictive 
SOP laws). Thus, opposing the relaxation of SOP laws necessarily places physician groups 
directly at odds with reducing physicians’ liability exposure. To the extent that physician 
groups wish to achieve their goal of reducing physician liability exposure, they should 
consider moderating their stance on restrictive SOP laws.  
 272. AMA, supra note 14, at 238. See also id. (“Our AMA, in the public interest, opposes 
enactment of legislation to authorize the independent practice of medicine by any individual 
who has not completed the state’s requirements for licensure to engage in the practice of 
medicine and surgery in all of its branches.”).  
 273. See, e.g., Letter from John Meigs, Jr., Bd. Chair, Am. Acad. of Family Physicians, to 
Hon. Mark Mustio, Majority Chairman, Prof’l Licensure Comm., Pa. House of Reprentatives 
& Hon. Harry Readshaw, Minority Chairman, Prof’l Licensure Comm., Pa. House of 
Representatives (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.aafp.org/dam/AAFP/documents/advocacy/work 
force/scope/LT-ProfessionalLicensure-OpposingPAAPRNScopeExpansion-101817.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZT9N-87EZ] (urging the Pennsylvania House of Representatives to reject 
an expansion of APRN authority).  
 274. See Kleiner et al., supra note 10, at 261 (noting that, consistent with an erosion of 
market power, allowing APRNs to practice independently reduces the wages of physicians). 
 275. See, e.g., Letter from Juliann G. Sebastian, Chair of the Bd. of Dirs., Am. Ass’n of 
Colls. of Nursing & Deborah E. Trautman, President and Chief Exec. Officer, Am. Ass’n 
Colls. of Nursing, to David O. Barbe, President, AMA & James L. Madara, Chief Exec. 
Officer, AMA (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.aacnnursing.org/News-Information/News/View 
/ArticleId/20827/Rounds-with-Leadership-11-29-17 [https://perma.cc/87F5-RPJZ] 
(responding vigorously to the AMA’s announced opposition to relaxing the SOP laws 
governing APRNs). 
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While the conflict over restrictive SOP laws is certainly political, it is not partisan. 
Both the Obama and Trump administrations issued reports noting concerns with SOP 
laws, emphasizing the harms these laws inflict on patients, and calling for the 
relaxation of the laws governing APRNs and PAs.276 Similarly, the left-leaning 
Brookings Institution and right-leaning American Enterprise Institute have both 
issued reports calling for the relaxation of SOP laws.277 The libertarian-leaning Cato 
Institute and Mercatus Center also support relaxing these laws.278 
The bipartisan and widespread support for relaxing SOP laws invites the obvious 
question of why states continue to maintain these restrictive laws. Political support 
from the AMA and other physician organizations can certainly explain much of 
states’ reluctance to reform these laws;279 however, states may also hesitate to relax 
their SOP laws based on the nature of the reform proposals to date. While available 
evidence suggests that states use the protection of patient safety as a pretext to 
maintain restrictive SOP laws that serve as anticompetitive barriers to protect 
physician market power, that evidence does not establish that states are wholly 
unconcerned with patient safety.280 To the extent that legitimate concerns about 
ensuring the provision of high-quality care and protecting patient safety enter states’ 
decisions to maintain restrictive SOP laws, existing proposals to relax these laws 
may simply be insufficient.  
In general, these proposals include straightforward recommendations that states 
eliminate restrictive SOP laws without any suggestion as to alternative legal regimes 
that may serve similar patient-safety goals as SOP laws.281 If state legislatures 
maintain a high evidentiary bar when deciding whether to amend laws that protect 
patient safety—an unsurprising and justifiable position given the paramount 
importance of patient safety in healthcare—they may balk at the opportunity to adopt 
previous proposals for relaxation because those proposals generally offer no 
 
 
 276. See U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. ET AL., supra note 12 at 31–36; U.S. DEP’T 
TREASURY, supra note at 1213–14.  
 277. See ADAMS & MARKOWITZ, supra note 9, at 5–6 (urging the relaxation of APRN and 
PA SOP laws in a report issued by the Hamilton Project which is an initiative within the 
Brookings Institution); PETER BUERHAUS, AM. ENTER. INST., NURSE PRACTITIONERS: A 
SOLUTION TO AMERICA’S PRIMARY CARE CRISIS 1–2 (2018) (urging the relaxation of APRN 
SOP laws).  
 278. See Charles Hughes, These Scope of Practice Laws Don’t Improve Health Outcomes, 
Serve Mainly as Barriers to Entry, CATO INST.: CATO AT LIBERTY (Nov. 2, 2016, 12:31 PM), 
https://www.cato.org/blog/these-scope-practice-laws-dont-improve-health-outcomes-serve-
mainly-barriers-entry [https://perma.cc/93WU-SVNZ] (noting the harms associated with 
restrictive SOP laws); Scope-of-Practice Laws, MERCATUS CTR. (Mar. 22, 2017), 
https://www.mercatus.org/scopeofpractice [https://perma.cc/YB93-DUKA] (emphasizing the 
harms of restrictive SOP laws and arguing in favor of relaxation).  
 279. See McMichael, supra note 13, at 298. 
 280. ADAMS & MARKOWITZ, supra note 9, at 6; GILMAN & KOSLOV, supra note 8, at 1 
(noting that state legislators are “rightly concerned with patient health and safety”).  
 281. See, e.g., ADAMS & MARKOWITZ, supra note 9, at 6 (“We argue that shifting spending 
away from physician to [APRN and PA] services through a loosening of anticompetitive SOP 
barriers is a viable and desirable policy route for the United States.”). 
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alternative mechanism to promote patient safety.282 This Article fills that salient gap 
in existing proposals by identifying a separate legal regime that can work to promote 
patient safety.  
Specifically, it offers tort law as an alternative mechanism to promote patient 
safety, and two strands of empirical research support the use of tort law in this 
context. First, prior research has demonstrated that malpractice liability deters the 
provision of low-quality and unsafe care.283 For example, Iizuka concluded “that 
higher liability pressure reduces preventable medical complications . . . .”284 
Similarly, Frakes and Jena emphasized the deterrence role fulfilled by malpractice 
liability, noting that “medical liability forces . . . hold the potential to elevate the 
quality [of care].”285 Considering the significance of malpractice liability more 
generally, Frakes noted that this liability “remain[s] a quite relevant influence on 
physician practices in a more universal sense.”286 Finally, examining the specific 
deterrence that malpractice claims exert—as opposed to malpractice pressure more 
generally—two studies found evidence that individual physicians change how they 
provide care after malpractice claims are filed against them.287  
Second, the empirical evidence provided here demonstrates that tort law can 
effectively deter APRNs and PAs just as it can physicians. As the results above 
indicate, providers respond differently following the relaxation of SOP laws 
depending on the malpractice pressure present in their state. While these different 
responses provide important evidence of an interaction between SOP laws and 
malpractice liability, they also offer evidence of the deterrent effect of malpractice 
liability on the provision of obstetric care. For example, when malpractice pressure 
is high, providers may perform more C-sections.288 Relaxing APRN and PA SOP 
laws reduces C-sections significantly more when malpractice pressure is low, 
demonstrating that APRNs and PAs respond to malpractice pressure as physicians 
do. Given this clear and predictable response to malpractice pressure following the 
relaxation of SOP laws, states can be confident that eliminating restrictive laws will 
not result in a vacuum in which providers can freely deliver substandard and unsafe 
care. Instead, once exposed to liability risk traceable to their own actions, APRNs 
and PAs will respond to the deterrence exerted by malpractice liability. 
Moreover, the analysis and evidence provided here suggests that, by eliminating 
the complications imposed on the functioning of malpractice liability by restrictive 
SOP laws, states may better enable tort law to exert deterrence on individual 
providers. As discussed above, restrictive laws shift liability from APRNs and PAs 
to physicians.289 Accordingly, tort law overdeters the latter and underdeters the 
 
 
 282. See Mark & Patel, supra note 259, at 485 (“Another possibility is that state legislators 
do not have enough evidence to inform legislative priorities.”).  
 283. This prior evidence is entirely consistent with the empirical results reported here 
which indicate that providers (of all types) change how they deliver care in response to 
malpractice pressure. See supra Part III. 
 284. Iizuka, supra note 17, at 164.  
 285. Frakes & Jena, supra note 18, at 144. 
 286. Frakes, supra note 217, at 385.  
 287. See Dranove & Watanabe, supra note 93, at 85–91; Shurtz, supra note 91, at 339–40.  
 288. Yang et al., supra note 22, at 239.  
 289. See supra Section IV.B.  
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former.290 By relaxing SOP laws, thereby eliminating this liability shifting, states can 
allow malpractice liability to deter physicians, APRNs, and PAs directly. Facing 
liability risk commensurate with their own actions and only their own actions, 
providers of all types can respond directly to the incentives to provide safe care 
created by tort law. Thus, not only does tort law provide an alternative mechanism 
to accomplish patient-safety goals, it functions better in achieving these goals once 
restrictive SOP laws—and the complications they impose—are removed.  
I do not mean to suggest, however, that tort law or medical malpractice liability 
as currently conceived and practiced represents an ideal approach. Legal, medical, 
and economic scholars—myself included—have articulated specific criticisms of the 
current tort system,291 and the results presented above suggest that malpractice 
pressure may encourage the overuse of C-sections (i.e., overdeter providers). By 
offering tort law as an alternative mechanism to accomplish patient-safety goals, I 
am not arguing that policymakers and scholars should abandon attempts to address 
the shortcomings of medical malpractice liability.292 Instead, I argue only that tort 
law, despite its shortcomings, can effectively deter healthcare providers and that this 
deterrence (imperfect as it may be) can accomplish the patient-safety goals that 
currently support maintaining restrictive SOP laws.  
Importantly, tort law can achieve these goals without imposing the substantial and 
pervasive harms that prior work has shown accompany restrictive SOP laws. Indeed, 
the results presented above demonstrate that the increase in the intensity of care 
attributable to malpractice pressure is only a fraction of the increase attributable to 
SOP laws. Tort law can also better ensure patient safety once restrictive SOP laws, 
and the liability shifting they facilitate, are eliminated. Finally, it is worth noting that, 
with restrictive SOP laws eliminated, efforts to reform tort law to better calibrate the 
deterrence it exerts can move forward without needing to address the complicated 
liability shifting induced by restrictive SOP laws.  
CONCLUSION 
Examining all births in the United States between 1998 and 2015, I find consistent 
evidence that allowing APRNs and PAs to practice with more autonomy reduces the 
use of medically intensive procedures. Extending the analysis, I also find evidence 
that the effect of relaxing SOP laws differs depending on the malpractice pressure 
faced by providers. This evidence is consistent both with liability shifting among 
providers when restrictive SOP laws are in place and with tort law exerting a stronger 
deterrent effect on APRNs and PAs when they can practice with more autonomy.  
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 291. See, e.g., Avraham & Schanzenbach, supra note 16, at 278–84 (finding evidence that 
defensive medicine results in the inefficient provision of care); Frakes, supra note 217, at 378–
85 (noting new avenues for reform to address current problems in the medical malpractice 
system); McMichael et al., supra note 144, at 393–94 (arguing that apology laws are a new 
generation of tort reform that exacerbate the problems they are designed to solve); Mello et 
al., supra note 113 (exploring opportunities for tort reform at the federal level). 
   292.   Indeed, the evidence presented here, while not specific to defensive medicine, suggests 
that providers may be overdeterred by the current malpractice system and may practice 
defensively.  
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These results have important implications for the current understanding of how 
both SOP laws and malpractice liability impact the provision of healthcare. 
Additionally, the empirical evidence presented here suggests a possible resolution to 
the increasingly heated debate over SOP laws. States maintain these laws on the basis 
of protecting patient safety. To the extent this justification is not a pretext to protect 
physicians from competition in healthcare services markets, the results here suggest 
that eliminating restrictive SOP laws will not undermine patient safety. With these 
laws abrogated, tort law can better deter individual providers—physicians, APRNs, 
and PAs, alike—and thereby discourage the delivery of unsafe care. Indeed, the 
evidence and analysis presented here suggests that eliminating restrictive SOP laws 
may better promote patient safety. Doing so would eliminate the complicated ways 
in which these laws interact with malpractice liability and thereby inhibit the ability 
of tort law to deter individual providers. Overall, the empirical evidence presented 
in this Article favors relaxing restrictive SOP laws and suggests that doing so will 
improve healthcare delivery, access to care, and patient safety.
 
